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I. INTRODUCTION
On October 11, 1984, Clyde White, a homeless resident of Chatta-
nooga, Tennessee, witnessed the murder of Francis Willard Smith.' Af-
ter having been interrogated by a police detective, White was arrested
and brought before the city court. 2 The presiding judicial officer, pursu-
ant to the Tennessee material witness provisions, 3 set White's bail at
1. White ex rel. Swafford v. Gerbitz, 892 F.2d 457, 458 (6th Cir. 1989). Be-
cause White brought a similar but separate action against different defendants in
1988, the central case against the judicial officers and the city discussed herein
will be referred to as White H and the earlier case, White ex rel. Swafford v.
Gerbitz, 860 F.2d 661 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1028 (1989), against
the District Attorney, et al., will be referred to as White I.
2. White 11, 892 F.2d at 458-59. The material witness legislation as part of
the Tennessee bail statute under which White was detained does not explicitly
authorize the arrest and detention of a material witness, but it does specifically
state that the court has the authority to order a witness to post bail. TENN. CODE
ANN. § 40-11-110 (1990). In White M, the Sixth Circuit discussed this issue with
regard to the district court's evaluation that the authority to arrest and detain
witnesses did in fact exist. White 11, 892 F.2d at 460. The Sixth Circuit con-
cluded that "[tihe district court properly recognized that [the material witness]
statute inherently contemplates that material witnesses are subject to arrest and
detention under appropriate circumstances. Such an interpretation is necessary
to effectuate the statutory authority given to courts to impose bail on material
witnesses." Id. at 460.
3. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-11-110. The relevant sections of the Tennessee
statute are listed below. Section 40-11-110 provides:
Bail for material witness. - If it appears by affidavit that the testimony of a
person is material in any criminal proceeding and if it is shown that the
witness has refused or will refuse to respond to process, the court may
require him to give bail under § 40-11-117 or § 40-11-122 for his ap-
pearance as a witness, in an amount fixed by the court. If the person
fails to give bail, the court may commit him to the custody of the sheriff
pending final disposition of the proceeding in which the testimony is
needed, may order his release if he has been detained for an unreason-
able length of time, and may modify at any time the requirement as to
bail. If the person does not comply with the conditions of the bail
bond, the court having jurisdiction shall enter an order declaring the
bail to be forfeited as provided in § 40-11-120 or § 40-11-139.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-11-110 (1990).
Section 40-11-115 provides:
Release on recognizance or unsecured bond-Factors considered. -
(a) Any person charged with a bailable offense may, before a magis-
trate authorized to admit him to bail, be ordered released pending trial
on his personal recognizance or upon the execution of an unsecured
appearance bond in an amount specified by the magistrate.
(b) In determining whether or not such person shall be released as
provided herein and that such a release will reasonably assure the ap-
[Vol. 36: p. 597
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$500 to secure White's presence at the trial of Gregory Denson, the sus-
pected murderer. 4 As a consequence of White's indigence and his in-
ability to pay the bail, he remained imprisoned for 288 days.
5
The requirement of bail or recognizance is a common procedure
utilized in the treatment of material witnesses throughout the country.
6
In circumstances when the witness is either indigent or homeless, how-
pearance of the person as required, the magistrate shall take into
account:
(1) The defendant's length of residence in the community;
(2) His employment status and history and his financial condition;
(3) His family ties and relationships;
(4) His reputation, character and mental condition;
(5) His prior criminal record including prior releases on recogni-
zance or bail;
(6) The identity of responsible members of the community who
will vouch for defendant's reliability;
(7) The nature of the offense and the apparent probability of con-
viction and the likely sentence, insofar as these factors are relevant
to the risk of nonappearance; and
(8) Any other factors indicating the defendant's ties to the commu-
nity or bearing on the risk of willful failure to appear.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-11-115 (1990).
Section 40-11-116 provides:
Conditions on release. - (a) If a defendant does not qualify for a release
upon recognizance under § 40-11-115, then the magistrate shall im-
pose the least onerous conditions reasonably likely to assure the de-
fendant's appearance in court.
(b) If conditions on release are found necessary, the magistrate may
impose one (1) or more of the following conditions:
(1) Release the defendant into the care of some qualified person
or organization responsible for supervising the defendant and assisting
him in appearing in court. Such supervisor shall maintain close contact
with the defendant, assist him in making arrangements to appear in
court, and, where appropriate, accompany him to court. The supervi-
sor shall not be required to be financially responsible for the defendant,
nor to forfeit money in the event he fails to appear in court.
(2) Place the defendant under the supervision of an available pro-
bation counselor or other appropriate public official.
(3) Impose reasonable restrictions on the activities, movements,
associations and residences of the defendant.
(4) Impose any other reasonable restriction designed to assure the
defendant's appearance, including but not limited to the deposit of bail
pursuant to § 40-11-117.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-11-116 (1990).
Section 40-11-117 provides:
Bail Security required. - Absent a showing that conditions on a release on
recognizance will reasonably assure the appearance of the defendant as
required, the magistrate shall, in lieu of the conditions of release set
out in § 40-11-115 or § 40-11-116, require bail to be given.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-11-117 (1990).
4. White 11, 892 F.2d at 459.
5. Id.
6. For state and federal material witness provisions pertaining to bail or
recognizance, see supra note 3 and infra notes 25, 26, 37, 39, 199, 239 and ac-
companying text.
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ever, the application of such procedures can result in the most severe
consequences.
In White's case, after his release following ten months imprison-
ment, he brought an action, pursuant to section 1983 of the Civil Rights
Act,7 alleging that the judicial officers, the arresting officer and the city
of Chattanooga had violated his civil rights. 8 The trial court granted
summary judgment for the defendants and the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed.9
This Note questions the constitutionality of the Tennessee statute
with regard to a material witness' rights under the fourth, fifth, eighth
and fourteenth amendments, with specific concentration on the right to
counsel. 10 Before specifically addressing the Tennessee statute, how-
ever, this Note will first examine the general rationale behind material
witness statutes and the development of the comprehensive federal bail
legislation, codified in the Bail Reform Act of 1984 (Bail Reform Act),
which in part addresses the treatment of material witnesses."l Various
state statutes will also be evaluated, focusing on the disparity between
these statutes and the provisions of the Bail Reform Act. 12 Finally, this
Note will analyze the procedures employed by the Tennessee judicial
officers in White ex rel. Swafford v. Gerbitz,13 concentrating on the methods
utilized in setting White's bail, which effectively assured his prolonged
incarceration, as well as those rights which, if exercised, may have reme-
died White's situation.14
II. BACKGROUND
A. The History and Development of the Federal Material Witness Provisions
Since 1789, the federal courts have possessed the authority to arrest
7. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). For the text of § 1983, see infra note 179.
8. White H, 892 F.2d at 458. White alleged that his arrest and initial deten-
tion was violative of his federal due process rights, that he had been "subjected
to an unlawful seizure" and that his detention had constituted "cruel and inhu-
mane treatment." Id. at 460. White's action also included several pendent
claims under state law regarding the Tennessee material witness provisions and
his arrest pursuant to such provisions. Id.
9. Id. at 464. The Sixth Circuit qualified its dismissal by stating that
although the § 1983 claim was properly dismissed, the court "certainly d[oes]
not condone White's extended incarceration as a material witness." Id.
10. For a discussion of cases in which fourth, fifth, eighth and fourteenth
amendment rights were raised, see infra notes 30-35, 47-107 and accompanying
text.
11. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3142, 3144 (1988). For the relevant text of these sections,
see infra note 26.
12. For the text of the state statutes discussed herein, see infra notes 25, 39,
199 & 239.
13. 892 F.2d 457 (6th Cir. 1989). For an explanation of the difference be-
tween White H and what will be referred to as White I, see supra note 1.
14. For an analysis of release procedures that may have expedited White's
release, see infra notes 141-54, 225 and accompanying text.
600 [Vol. 36: p. 597
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and detain material witnesses.' 5 Although the federal system today still
allows a witness to be arrested and detained pursuant to the required
showings, the statute under which such action is authorized has under-
gone vast changes in an attempt, in part, to safeguard the rights of mate-
rial witnesses. Almost all legislation authorizing the arrest or detention
of material witnesses, both in the federal system and in the state systems,
requires a showing that the witness' testimony is material and that it
would be otherwise impracticable to secure his appearance at trial. A
court's authority to order the arrest and detention a material witness has
been justified by the sixth amendment confrontation clause mandating
that "[iun all criminal prosecutions ... the accused shall enjoy the right
to be confronted with the witnesses against him."' 6 Furthermore, the
15. Kling, A Mandatory Right to Counsel for the Material Witness, 19 U. MIcH.
J.L. REF. 475, 476-77 (1986). An earlier material witness provision, 28 U.S.C.
§ 659 (1928) (repealed 1952), read as follows:
Any judge of the United States, on the application of a district attorney,
and on being satisfied by proof that the testimony of any person is com-
petent and will be necessary on the trial of any criminal proceeding in
which the United States are parties or are interested, may compel such
person to give recognizance, with or without sureties, at his discretion,
to appear to testify therein; and, for that purpose, may issue a warrant
against such person, under his hand, with or without seal, directed to
the marshall or other officer authorized to execute process in behalf of
the United States, to arrest and bring him such person. If the person so
arrested neglects or refuses to give recognizance in the manner re-
quired, the judge may issue a warrant of commitment against him, and
the officer shall convey him to the prison therein. And the said person
shall remain in confinement until he is removed to the court for the
purpose of giving his testimony, or until he gives the recognizance re-
quired by said judge.
28 U.S.C. § 659 (1928) (repealed 1952). Following the repeal of this provision,
the legislature enacted Rule 46(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure;
until 1972, Rule 46(b) provided the following:
If it appears by affidavit that the testimony of a person is material in any
criminal proceeding, and if it is shown that it may become impracticable
to secure his presence by subpoena, the court or commissioner may
require him to give bail for his appearance as a witness in an amount
fixed by the court or commissioner. If the person fails to give bail, the
court or commissioner may commit him to the custody of the marshall
pending final disposition of the proceeding in which the testimony is
needed, may order his release if he has .been detained for an unreason-
able length of time and may modify at any time the requirement of bail.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 46(b) (amended 1972). Following the enactment of the Bail
Reform Act of 1966, Rule 46(b) was amended as follows:
A person released before trial shall continue on release during trial
under the same terms and conditions as were previously imposed un-
less the court determines that other terms and conditions or termina-
tion of release are necessary to assure his presence during the trial or to
assure that his conduct will not obstruct the orderly and expeditious
progress of the trial.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 46(b). The Bail Reform Act of 1984 was later codified and the
present federal material witness provisions were enacted. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3142,
3144 (1988). For the full text of § 3144, see infra note 26.
16. United States v. Eufracio-Torres, 890 F.2d 266, 269 (10th Cir. 1989),
1991] NOTE
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necessity of maintaining a fair and effective judicial system has also been
held to warrant the detention of a material witness. 17
In 1929, Barry v. United States ex rel. Cunningham18 presented one of
the earliest challenges to the constitutionality of material witness deten-
tion.19 In Barry, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the constitu-
tionality of the power possessed by the United States Senate to
authorize the arrest of a material witness upon a showing that the wit-
ness would not voluntarily attend a Senate hearing. 20 The Supreme
cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1306 (1990) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. VI). For the text
of the sixth amendment, see supra note 48. The Tenth Circuit, reviewing a de-
fendant's right to confront the witnesses against him as opposed to confronting
deposition testimony, quoted the Supreme Court as follows:
The Court has emphasized that the Confrontation Clause reflects a
preference for face-to-face confrontation at trial, and that "a primary
interest secured by [the clause] is the right of cross-examination." In
short, the Clause envisions "a personal examination and cross-exami-
nation of the witness, in which the accused has an opportunity, not only
of testing the recollection and sifting the conscience of the witness, but
of compelling him to stand face to face with the jury in order that they
may look at him, and judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the
manner in which he gives his testimony whether he is worthy of belief."
Eufracio-Torres, 890 F.2d at 269 (quoting Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63-64
(1980) (footnote and citations omitted)).
17. See Comfort v. Kittle, 81 Iowa 179, 181-85, 46 N.W. 988, 989-90 (1890)
(reviewing that legislature's role in statutorily authorizing courts to require that
a witness post bail in order to secure his testimony); Comment, Witnesses - Impris-
onment of the Material Witness for Failure to Give Bond, 40 NEB. L. REV. 503, 512 n.45
(1961) (citing letter from Edward S. Silver, District Attorney of Kings County,
New York, January 11, 1960 which read:
The prosecutor will favor this type of statute, knowing full well that
innocent people are to be deprived of their liberty. Such deprivation,
however, flows naturally from the efforts of maintaining an organized
and civilized society. The forces of evil will not hesitate to tamper with
a witness, and sometimes the forces of fear are more potent. The pros-
ecutor must preserve his evidence. If to do this an innocent person is
to be jailed, it is the sacrifice he must make as his contribution to law
and order.).
For the Supreme Court's view of a citizen's duty to testify, see infra notes 48-50
and accompanying text.
18. 279 U.S. 597 (1929).
19. Id.
20. Id. at 599. In Barry, the Court stated that the constitutionality of the
federal statute allowing for the arrest and confinement of a material witness has
never been contested. Id. at 617. In its review of this authority, the Court relied
on United States v. Lloyd and State of Minnesota ex rel. Howard v. Grace. Id.
(citing United States v. Lloyd, 26 F. Cas. 984 (S.D.N.Y. 1860) (No. 15, 614) (va-
lidity of federal statute authorizing detention of witness as well as release pursu-
ant to offer of recognizance of $1000); State of Minn. ex rel. Howard v. Grace, 18
Minn. 398 (1872) (validity of state material witness provision upheld)). The
Court in Barry, quoting the Grace court, stated the following: "The law intends
that the witness shall be forthcoming at all events, and it is a lenient mode which
it provides to permit him to go at large upon his own recognizance. However
this is only one mode of accomplishing the end, which is his due appearance."
Id. (citation omitted). Based partially on the aforementioned evaluation, the
602
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Court stated that "a court has power in the exercise of a sound discre-
tion to issue a warrant of arrest without a previous subpoena... and
that such person may be confined until removed for the purpose of giv-
ing his testimony."'2 '
Since Barry, federal legislation regarding the circumstances of
arrest, detention and release of material witnesses has been developed
in an attempt to ensure that witnesses will not be subject to unnecessary
incarceration. 22 Today, section 3144 of the Bail Reform Act authorizes
the arrest of a witness where "it appears from an affidavit ... that the
testimony of a person is material in a criminal proceeding" and that "it
may become impracticable to secure the presence of the person by sub-
poena." 2 3 The Bail Reform Act further provides that a witness cannot
be detained simply "because of [his] inability to comply with any condi-
tion of release if the testimony of such witness can adequately be se-
cured by deposition, and if further detention is not necessary to prevent
a failure ofjustice." 24 This provision was intended to assure that a wit-
ness would not be unnecessarily detained solely because of his inability
to post bail.25 Section 3144 of the Bail Reform Act also refers the court
Court concluded that "[tlhe Senate, having sole authority under the Constitu-
tion to judge of the elections, returns and qualifications of its members, may
exercise in its own right the incidental power of compelling the attendance of
witnesses without the aid of a statute." Id. at 619.
21. Id. at 616-17 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 659 (1928) (repealed 1952)). The
Court went on to further note that,
where suspicions exist that a witness may disappear, or be spirited
away, before trial, in criminal cases.., he may be held to bail to appear
at the trial and may be committed on failure to furnish it, and that such
imprisonment does not violate the sanctions of the federal or state
constitutions.
Id. at 618.
22. Recently, Congress revised the federal material witness provisions
along with provisions regarding the detention of defendants in criminal prose-
cutions. The legislation was passed in its new form in 1984 as the Bail Reform
Act. For a general discussion of the Bail Reform Act and its implications, see
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987) (Court upheld validity of Bail Re-
form Act of 1984 in response to petitioner's challenge of facial unconstitutional-
ity); Berg, The Bail Reform Act of 1984, 34 EMORY L.J. 685 (1985); Comment,
United States v. Salerno: "A Loaded Weapon Ready for the Hand," 54 BROOKLYN L.
REV. 171 (1988); Note, The Effect of Salerno v. United States on the Use of State
Preventive Detention Legislation: A New Definition of Due Process, 22 GA. L. REV. 805
(1988).
23. 18 U.S.C. § 3144 (1988). For the text of this section, see infra note 26.
24. Id. The prior federal material witness provision contained an almost
identical qualification. 18 U.S.C. § 3149 (1970) (repealed 1984) (current ver-
sion at 18 U.S.C. § 3141 (1988)). However, the Tennessee statute involved in
White does not contain this type of safeguard which works to release the witness
as soon as his testimony can be sufficiently secured. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-11-
110.
25. See 18 U.S.C. § 3144 (1988). Although the federal legislation mandates
that a witness should not be incarcerated merely because he is financially unable
to post bail, state legislation is not so clear. For example, the Tennessee statute
says nothing about the problems which arise when a witness is indigent and
1991] NOTE 603
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to section 3142 which outlines the release procedures applicable to both
detained witnesses and criminal defendants. 26
therefore subject to detention solely because of his inability to post bail. TENN.
CODE ANN. § 40-11-110. The New Jersey material witness provision, in compari-
son, simply states that the judicial official:
shall, when in his judgement the ends of justice so require, bind by
recognizance, with sufficient surety, any person who shall declare
against another person for any crime punishable by death or imprison-
ment in the state prison, or any person who can give testimony against
any person so accused of any such crime, whether the offender be ar-
rested, imprisoned, bailed or not.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-2 (West 1985). Other statutes guide the court so that
an indigent witness will be released without posting bond in particular circum-
stances; for example the Massachusetts statute reads as follows:
A witness who, when required, refuses to recognize, either with or
without sureties, shall, except as provided in the following section, be
committed to jail until he complies with such order or is otherwise dis-
charged; but if the court or justice finds that the witness, unless he is
the prosecutor or accomplice, is unable to procure sureties when so
ordered, he shall, except in cases of felony, be discharged upon his own
recognizance. Upon a complaint or indictment for a felony, against a
defendant not in custody, a material witness committed for failure to
furnish sureties upon his own recognizance may be held in custody for
a reasonable time, pending the pursuit and apprehension of the
defendant.
MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 276, § 49 (West 1972). It should be noted, however,
that this statute, although attempting to protect an indigent witness from deten-
tion under circumstances where the defendant has been charged with something
other than a felony, allows for the detention of the witness when the search for
the defendant is ongoing. Id. For a general discussion of state material witness
procedures, see infra notes 36-41 and accompanying text.
26. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(a)(1) (1988). Section 3144 provides:
If it appears from an affidavit filed by a party that the testimony of a person
is material in a criminal proceeding, and if it is shown that it may become
impracticable to secure the presence of the person by subpoena, a judicial officer
may order the arrest of the person and treat the person in accordance
with the provisions of section 3142 of this title. No material witness may be
detained because of inability to comply with any condition of release if the testimony
of such witness can adequately be secured by deposition, and iffurther detention is
not necessary to prevent afailure ofjustice. Release of a material witness may
be delayed for a reasonable period of time until the deposition of the
witness can be taken pursuant to the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
18 U.S.C. § 3144 (1988) (emphasis added).
Section 3144 refers the court directly to § 3142 which contains a compre-
hensive list of potential conditions to which the court may subject the witness if
the court feels that his testimony is in jeopardy. Section 3142 provides in perti-
nent part:
(a) In general. Upon the appearance before a judicial officer of a person
charged with an offense, the judicial officer shall issue an order that,
pending trial, the person be -
(1) released on personal recognizance or upon execution of an un-
secured appearance bond, under subsection (b) of this section;
(2) released on a condition or combination of conditions under
subsection (c) of this section;
(3) temporarily detained to permit revocation of conditional re-
8
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The least stringent of the conditions found in section 3142 is the
release of a witness on his own recognizance. 27 If the court finds, how-
lease, deportation, or exclusion under subsection (d) of this sec-
tion; or
(4) detained under subsection (e) of this section.
(c) Release on conditions. (1) If the judicial officer determines that the
release described in subsection (b) of this section will not reasonably
assure the appearance of the person... such judicial officer shall order
the pretrial release of the person -
(A) subject to the condition that the person not commit a Federal,
State or local crime during the period of release; and
(B) subject to the least resthictive further condition, or combination of
conditions, that such judicial officer determines will reasonably as-
sure the appearance of the person as required and the safety of any
other person and the community, which may include the condition
that the person -
(i) remain in the custody of a designated person, who agrees
to assume supervision and to report any violation of a release
condition to the court, if the designated person is able reason-
ably to assure the judicial officer that the person will appear as
required and will not pose a danger to the safety of any other
person or the community;
(ii) maintain employment, or, if unemployed, actively seek
employment;
(iii) maintain or commence an educational program;
(iv) abide by specified restrictions on personal associations,
place of abode, or travel;
(vi) report on a regular basis to a designated law enforcement
agency, pretrial services agency, or other agency;
(vii) comply with a specified curfew order;
(viii) refrain from possessing a firearm, destructive device, or
other dangerous weapon;
(ix) refrain from excessive use of alcohol, or any use of a nar-
cotic drug or other controlled substance... ;
(x) undergo available medical, psychological, or psychiatric
treatment, including treatment for drug or alcohol depen-
dency, and remain in a specified institution if required for that
purpose;
(xi) execute an agreement to forfeit upon failing to appear as
required, such designated property, including money, as is
reasonably necessary to assure the appearance of the person
as required ... ;
(xii) execute a bail bond with solvent sureties in such amount
as is reasonably necessary to assure the appearance of the per-
son as required;
(xiii) return to custody for specified hours following release
for employment, schooling, or other limited purposes; and
(xiv) satisfy any other condition that is reasonably necessary
to assure the appearance of the person as required ....
(2) The judicial officer may not impose a financial condition that
results in the pretrial detention of the person.
18 U.S.C. § 3142 (emphasis added).
27. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(b) (1988). This section enables the judicial officer to
release the witness on his own recognizance "unless the judicial officer deter-
9
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ever, that an unrestricted release will not guarantee a witness' attend-
ance at trial, the court may impose conditions on his release such as
requiring that the witness "remain in the custody of a designated per-
son" or "maintain ... or ... seek employment ... or commence an
educational program."'28 The federal statute further requires the court
to utilize the least restrictive measure which will effectively ensure the
witness' presence at trial. 29 Yet, the decision as to the particular circum-
stances of release or incarceration remains within the broad discretion
of the court.
The present federal material witness legislation contains two signifi-
cant provisions which seek to ensure that a witness will be treated in
accordance with the constitutional requirements of due process under
the fifth amendment.8 0 The first provision requires that the court re-
mines that such release will not reasonably assure the appearance of the [wit-
ness]." Id.
28. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c) (1988). For the full text of this section, see supra
note 26.
29. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(B) (1988). For the language of the federal mate-
rial witness statute requiring that the court impose the "least onerous" treat-
ment upon the witness, see supra note 26.
The Tennessee statute under which White was held refers the court to § 40-
11-117 which in turn refers the court to § 40-11-116 wherein it is stated that
"the magistrate shall impose the least onerous conditions reasonably likely to
assure the defendant's appearance in court." TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-11-116
(1990). For the complete text of this statute, see supra note 3.
30. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The fifth amendment, in pertinent part, reads:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury... nor
shall [any person] be compelled in any criminal cases to be a witness
against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law ....
Id. The due process rights under the fifth amendment, and those under the
fourteenth amendment as applied to the states, have been held to attach in cer-
tain civil matters as well as criminal procedures where an individual's liberty is
being threatened. See, e.g., Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980) (holding four-
teenth amendment due process rights applicable to liberty interests of state pris-
oner before involuntary transfer to state mental hospital); Morrissey v. Brewer,
408 U.S. 471 (1972) (due process rights under fourteenth amendment attach
upon potential revocation of parole); United States v. Eufracio-Torres, 890 F.2d
266 (10th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1306 (1990) (holding fifth amend-
ment due process rights attach upon possible detention of material witness of
witness); Application of Cochran, 434 F. Supp. 1207, 1212 (D. Neb. 1977) (hold-
ing due process protection required when state "physically seizes a person and
then commits him to complete custodial detention for an extended period of
time").
In Morrissey, the petitioners, seeking a writ of habeas corpus, argued that
they had been denied due process under the fourteenth amendment when "their
paroles had been revoked without a hearing." Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 474. In
determining the extent of a parolee's due process rights, the Court stated that
"liberty is valuable and must be seen as within the protection of the Fourteenth
Amendment." Id. at 482. Having evaluated a parolee's liberty interests, the
Court set forth the following "minimum requirements" for revocation of parole:
(a) written notice of the claimed violations of parole; (b) disclosure to
10
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lease the witness, "subject to the least restrictive ... condition, or com-
bination of conditions, that such judicial officer determines will
reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required."'3 1 The
second provision, part of section 3142(f) of the Bail Reform Act, re-
quires that a hearing be held to determine what particular conditions
could be appropriately and justifiably placed on the witness' release; and
that the witness be afforded "the right to be represented by counsel [at
this hearing], and, if financially unable to obtain adequate representa-
tion, to have counsel appointed."'3 2 The first provision requires the
court to review the circumstances behind the witness' arrest and to in-
quire into whether the witness is responsible, reliable and willing to ap-
pear before the court at a later date.33 Such an inquiry will aid the court
in its determination of what restrictions, if any, are to be imposed upon
the witness' detention or release. 34 The second provision, which pro-
vides for adequate representation, may facilitate the witness' release; for
example, counsel may move for a reduction in bail or for an order that
the witness be deposed pursuant to the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure.35
the parolee of evidence against him; (c) opportunity to be heard in per-
son and to present witnesses and documentary evidence; (d) the right
to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses . . . ; (e) a "neutral
and detached" hearing body such as a traditional parole board, mem-
bers of which need not be judicial officers or lawyers; and (f) a written
statement by the factfinders as to the evidence relied on and reasons for
revoking parole.
Id. at 489.
31. 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (1988). The former material witness legislation, 18
U.S.C. § 3149 (1970) (repealed 1984), referred the court to § 3146 which
merely stated that the "judicial officer shall ... impose the first of the following
conditions of release which will reasonably assure the appearance of the person
for trial." 18 U.S.C. § 3146 (1970) (repealed 1984) (current version at 18 U.S.C.
§ 3144 (1988)). Apparently, the conditions are listed in order from the least
onerous to the most severe. Id. Although this provision did list factors for the
court to consider in making its determination, the statute as a whole was less
comprehensive than today's Bail Reform Act. For the complete language of
§ 3149, see infra note 67. Presently, § 3144 of the Bail Reform Act directs the
court to § 3142, which sets forth a comprehensive list of potential release condi-
tions applicable to both defendants and witnesses. 18 U.S.C. § 3142. For refer-
ences to the Bail Reform Act as a whole, see supra note 22.
32. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(0 (1988).
33. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(B) (1988). This section contains a list of poten-
tial factors and conditions relevant to the determination of a suitable release for
the witness including court appointed supervision, employment, education and
avoidance of drug or alcohol use. Id. In applying this section to a material wit-
ness' release, a judicial officer would be directed to this list of conditions
whereby the witness' characteristics and circumstances could be evaluated to de-
termine what would "reasonably assure the appearance of the person as re-
quired." Id. For the complete list of conditions offered by § 3142, see supra
note 26.
34. For a discussion of the Bail Reform Act, see Berg, supra note 22.
35. Fr. R. CRIM. P. 15(a). For the text of Rule 15(a), see infra text accom-
panying note 146.
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B. The Treatment of Matenal Witnesses Throughout the States
The federal provisions governing the treatment of material wit-
nesses, set forth in the Bail Reform Act, were reformed, in part, as an
attempt to ensure that witnesses would not be deprived of their liberty
unnecessarily. Such reform, however, has not occurred consistently
throughout the states.3 6 One of the most important distinctions be-
tween the state and federal provisions is that many states do not grant a
material witness the option of having court appointed counsel as does
section 3142 of the Bail Reform Act.3 7 Consequently, without the pro-
tection of effective representation, a material witness may suffer pro-
longed and unnecessary incarceration despite a lack of probable cause,
the failure of the judicial officer to inquire properly into the witness'
willingness to appear as defined by the statute, or an affidavit that fails to
include the statutorily required showings.3 8 Furthermore, as discussed
below, without the assistance of counsel, collateral attacks contesting a
witness' incarceration are extremely rare.
Although they lack the safeguards of the federal system, the state
statutes have been generally upheld.3 9 For example, the NewJersey ma-
36. See Kling, supra note 15, at 480-81 n.37 (citing particular state statutes
varying in procedural and substantive treatment of material witnesses).
The Bail Reform Act arms a witness with various remedial measures which
he can pursue to expedite his release. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3142, 3144 (1988). For the
full text of these statutes, see supra note 26. Section 3142 applies specifically to
the treatment of defendants awaiting criminal proceedings. 18 U.S.C. § 3142.
Although the primary federal material witness provision is § 3144, that section
makes reference to § 3142 regarding the treatment of witnesses. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3144.
Many of the states have not followed the federal system's lead and have
failed to reexamine their own statutes, at least with respect to the possibility that
their statutes deprive a witness of his right to due process under the law. See
Kling, supra note 15, at 480-81 n.37. For example, the Tennessee bail statute,
enacted in 1978, neither guarantees a witness the assistance of counsel, nor spe-
cifically provides for the taking of a deposition as an alternative to detention.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-11-110 (1990). For the full text of this statute, see supra
note 3. For a discussion of the necessity of counsel and the federal response to
such necessity, see infra notes 101-07, 109-27 and accompanying text.
37. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3142, 3144 (1988). For state statutes and constitutions
also affording a right to counsel, see COLO. CONST. art. II, § 17; KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 22-2805 (1988); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 276, § 47 (West 1972); N.Y. CRIM.
PRO. LAw § 620.40 (McKinney 1984); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-803 (1989); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 719 (West 1969 & Supp. 1991).
38. See White II, 892 F.2d at 463 (affidavit presented to court failed to in-
clude necessary showings that witness's testimony was material and that he
would refuse to respond to process).
39. See, e.g., White II, 892 F.2d 457; In re Grzyeskowitak, 267 Mich. 697, 255
N.W. 359 (1934); People ex rel. Van Der Beek v. McClosky, 18 A.D.2d 205, 210,
238 N.Y.S.2d 676, 682 (1963).
In Grzyeskowitak, the Michigan Supreme Court granted a writ of habeas
corpus requested by a material witness held pursuant to the following statute:
Whenever it shall appear to any court of record that any person is a
material witness in any criminal case pending in any court in the county
608
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terial witness provision, as part of the New Jersey Bail & Recognizance
Statute, authorizes a judicial officer "when in his judgment the ends of
justice so require, [to] bind by recognizance, with sufficient surety, any
person who shall declare against another person for any crime punish-
able by death or imprisonment .... ",40 Another section of the New
Jersey statute provides that the "witness shall [neither] be kept in the
same apartment with ... the person[] charged" nor suffer "further re-
strict[ion] of [his] liberty than is necessary." '4 1 Such statutory language
should work to protect a witness' liberty interests. Nevertheless, where
a judicial officer fails to act in accordance with the relevant statutory
authority, the effective assistance of counsel becomes crucial in protect-
ing the witness' rights. Moreover, the number and degree of incidents
in which a witness is held in violation of statutory authority unrepre-
sented by counsel are virtually impossible to determine due to the lack
of factual documentation surrounding such cases.
and that there is danger of the loss of testimony of such witness unless
he be required to furnish bail or be committed in the event that he fails
to furnish such bail, said court . . . shall require such witness to be
brought before him and after giving him an opportunity to be heard, if
it shall appear that such witness is a material witness and that there is
danger of the loss of his testimony unless he furnish bail or be commit-
ted, said court may require such witness to enter into a recognizance
... in such amount as the court may determine ....
Grzyeskowitak, 267 Mich. at 699, 255 N.W. at 360 (citation omitted). As the gov-
ernment, in Grzyeskowitak, had not yet indicted anyone for the murder, the peti-
tioner argued that he should be released because "the proceedings might
otherwise amount to life imprisonment without due process of law in the event
that the murderer were never apprehended." Id. at 701, 255 N.W. at 360-61.
The court granted the writ "upon condition that petitioner enter into a personal
recognizance to appear as a witness at the trial." Id. at 702, 255 N.W. at 361.
In reviewing the New York material witness statute, affirmed the lower
court's denial of petitioner's writ of habeas corpus. 18 A.D.2d at 210, 238
N.Y.S.2d at 682. In McClosky, the witness was committed to the sheriff's custody
for 30 days when he failed to post bail in the amount of $30,000, pursuant to the
New York statute in effect at the time. Id. at 207, 238 N.Y.S.2d at 679. In light
of the statutory provision mandating that a witness be entitled to the assistance
of counsel upon request, the court stated that it would be "appropriate that the
Justice, in the exercise of discretion, before whom the matter is brought, should,
even in the absence of any such request, inquire if the person desired counsel."
Id. at 209, 238 N.Y.S.2d at 682. Although the witness had not received the
assistance of counsel, the court denied habeas corpus relief because there was
no "fundamental unfairness or resulting prejudice from the failure of appellant
to have counsel ... so as to constitute a denial of due process." Id. at 210, 238
N.Y.S.2d at 682; see also Carlson,Jailing the Innocent: The Plight of the Material Wit-
ness, 55 IowA L. REV. 1 (1969) (overview of state material witness statutes and
constitutional considerations); Comment, Witnesses -Imprisonment of the Material
Witness for Failure to Give Bond, 40 NEB. L. REV. 503 (1961) (discussing constitu-
tional issues regarding material witness detention and benefit of such statutes).
40. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-2 (West 1985). For the full text of this sec-
tion, see supra note 25. For similar provisions in other states, see supra note 39
and infra notes 199 & 239.
41. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-3 (West 1985).
1991] NOTE 609
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C. Constitutional Challenges
Various constitutional claims have been raised by material witnesses
protesting their incarceration. It has been argued that the following
rights attach upon the arrest or detention of a witness: (1) the fourth
amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures and arrests
based on warrants unsupported by probable cause;4 2 (2) the fifth
amendment rights of due process including the right to be heard;4 3 (3)
the eighth amendment rights to be free from excessive bail and cruel
and unusual punishment;44 and (4) the fourteenth amendment right of
due process in state proceedings. 4 5 Essentially, these challenges are
based on the premise that material witness provisions deny a witness his
liberty without due process of law.4 6
1. The Fourth Amendment and the Probable Cause Requirement
As explained above, material witness provisions address the treat-
ment of a witness who is unlikely to appear at trial unless the court
places sufficient restrictions on his liberty.4 7 The justification for such
treatment, which can amount to the arrest and detention of a witness,
can be found in the sixth amendment, which guarantees anyone accused
of a crime the opportunity "to be confronted with the witnesses against
42. For a discussion of fourth amendment issues regarding material witness
statutes, see infra notes 47-72 and accompanying text.
43. For a discussion of fifth amendment issues regarding material witness
statutes, see supra notes 30-35 and infra notes 82-100 and accompanying text.
44. For a discussion of eighth amendment issues regarding material witness
statutes, see infra notes 73-78 and accompanying text.
45. See, e.g., White II, 892 F.2d at 464 (raising issues of eighth and four-
teenth amendment violations); Bacon v. United States, 449 F.2d 933 (9th Cir.
1971) (raising issues of fourth amendment violations as to probable cause);
Class Action Application for Habeas Corpus, 612 F. Supp. 940 (W.D. Tex. 1985)
(raising sixth amendment right to counsel claim); United States v. Feingold, 416
F. Supp. 627 (E.D.N.Y. 1976) (alleging fourth amendment violations).
46. For a discussion of cases in which such complaints of due process and
other constitutional violations were raised, see infra notes 82-107, 109-27 and
accompanying text.
47. Courts are often statutorily authorized to restrict a material witness' lib-
erty. For a discussion of the federal material witness provisions, see supra note
26. For a discussion of the Tennessee material witness provisions, see supra note
29 and infra notes 183-98 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 25, 37, 39
and infra notes 199, 239 and accompanying text for examples of state statutes
providing for the detention of material witnesses.
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him." 48 In Stein v. New York, 49 the power to authorize the arrest and
detention of a material witness was recognized by the United States
Supreme Court when it stated, "the duty to disclose knowledge of crime
...is so vital that one known to be innocent may be detained, in the
absence of bail, as a material witness." '50
Procedurally, however, before a witness can be arrested"1 and sub-
sequently detained, the requirement of probable cause must be satisfied.
The two elements of probable cause with respect to material witness in-
carceration are: (1) the determination that the testimony of the witness
is in fact material to the case, and (2) evidence that the appearance of
the witness will be impracticable to secure.52 If both criteria are met,
the witness may then be arrested and detained subject to the conditions
of release provided by the statute. 53
Many state material witness provisions are similar to the federal
provisions in that the criteria described above must be presented to the
court or presiding judicial officer in a sworn statement or affidavit usu-
ally set forth by either the arresting officer or the prosecutor.54 The
determination of whether the probable cause requirement has been met
is then left to the presiding judicial officer.5 5 Those challenges brought
under the fourth amendment have been most successful where a judicial
officer has authorized the arrest or detention of a witness without having
made the necessary inquiries to support a finding of probable cause.5 6
48. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The sixth amendment reads as follows:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed; which district shall have
been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him;
to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to
have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added).
49. 346 U.S. 156 (1953).
50. Id. at 184.
51. For a discussion of the probable cause requirement of arresting a wit-
ness, see supra notes 47-50 and infra notes 52-72 and accompanying text.
52. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 3142, 3144 (1988); HAw. REV. STAT. § 835-2
(1985); IOWA CODE § 804.23 (1979); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-11-110 (1990).
These requirements are found in virtually all material witness legislation. They
form the basis for arresting a witness and imposing conditions on his liberty.
For the text of various state statutes, see supra notes 25, 37, 39 and infra notes
199 & 239; see also supra note 26 for the text of the federal provisions.
53. For an example of potential release conditions in the federal material
witness provisions, see supra note 26.
54. For the text of both state and federal statutes providing for the require-
ment of an affidavit setting forth that the witness' testimony is material and that
it will be impracticable to secure his presence at trial without some condition or
restriction placed on his liberty, see supra notes 3 & 26.
55. For the text of both state and federal material witness provisions, see
supra notes 3, 25, 26 and infra notes 199 & 239.
56. The fourth amendment reads as follows:
1991] NOTE
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In Bacon v. United States,5 7 through a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus, the petitioner claimed that her arrest and detention, pursuant to
a material witness arrest warrant, were invalid because the warrant
lacked any assessment of the surrounding "circumstances from which
the judicial officer could find probable cause."'5 8 Specifically, it had not
been shown to the judicial officer "(1) 'that the testimony of [the witness
was] material' and (2) 'that it [might] become impracticable to secure his
presence by subpoena.' 59 In evaluating the requirement of probable
cause, the court stated that under the "Fourth Amendment, the essential
element is the physical restraint placed upon the person." 60 Based on
this determination, the Bacon court proceeded to analyze whether a
showing of probable cause was necessarily required in all cases involving
the detention of a material witness. 6 i The court noted that "a require-
ment of probable cause ... does not conflict with any legitimate public
interest,"' 62 and concluded that the judicial officer issuing a material wit-
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. For a discussion of cases in which petitioners have
raised successful claims of fourth amendment violations, see infra notes 57-72
and accompanying text.
57. 449 F.2d 933 (9th Cir. 1971). For a further discussion of Bacon, see
infra notes 58-65 and accompanying text.
58. Bacon, 449 F.2d at 943. Bacon's claims arose from the following facts.
Based on an affidavit sworn out by the United States Attorney for the Western
District of Washington, the district court issued an arrest warrant which author-
ized Bacon's arrest and transportation to Seattle. Id. at 934-35. Bacon was to
remain in the United States Marshall's custody unless she posted a bail of
$100,000. Id. The affidavit claimed that Bacon knew material facts which the
United States Attorney wanted to be presented to a grand jury, and that "a sub-
poena would be ineffective in securing her presence because she would flee the
jurisdiction ... to avoid giving testimony." Id. at 934.
Bacon's primary claim was not that the court lacked the authority to sub-
poena witnesses to testify in front of the grand jury, but rather that "the govern-
ment had no power to assure the attendance of grand jury witnesses by arrest
and detention before disobedience of a subpoena." Id. at 936 (emphasis added).
59. Id. at 943 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3149 (1970) (repealed 1984)). In deter-
mining what constituted probable cause, the court relied on Rule 46(b) of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and 18 U.S.C. § 3149 (1970) (repealed
1984), which has since been replaced by 18 U.S.C. § 3144 (1988). Bacon, 449
F.2d at 942-43. The court stated that "sufficient facts must be shown to give the
judicial officer probable cause to believe that it may be impracticable to secure
the presence of the witness by subpoena. Mere assertion will not do." Id. at
943. The court indicated that to issue a valid arrest warrant, a court would have
to be presented with evidence which would specifically support a finding of
probable cause, such as the surrounding circumstances of the witness' situation
or the willingness or unwillingness of the witness to testify. Id.
60. Bacon, 449 F.2d at 942.
61. Id. at 941-43.
62. Id. at 942.
612 [Vol. 36: p. 597
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ness warrant must have "probable cause to believe that it may be im-
practicable to secure the presence of the witness by subpoena. Mere
assertion will not do."' 63 Recognizing that the "arrest and detention of a
material witness is as much an invasion of the security of her person as if
she had been arrested on a criminal charge," 64 the court ultimately
quashed the arrest warrant and the witness was released. 65
Relying on Bacon, the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of New York, in United States v. Feingold,66 restated the require-
ments of probable cause necessary to issue a valid material witness
arrest warrant. 6 7 The court applied the probable cause criteria to Fein-
gold's motion to quash the arrest warrant issued against him.6 8 In its
analysis, the court focused on Feingold's "unwillingness" to appear
before the court as a witness. 6 9 The determination that Feingold was
unwilling to appear had been based on an affidavit submitted by an
I.R.S. agent describing several "unsuccessful attempts to serve Fein-
gold." 70 Having concluded that the probable cause element had been
met, the court denied the motion to quash the warrant. 7 1 The court,
however, noted that, pursuant to the federal provisions, Feingold would
be "entitled to present additional information to the appropriate judicial
officer to arrange suitable conditions for his release."'72
63. Id. at 943. In so holding, the court found Bacon's arrest warrant inva-
lid. Id. at 945.
64. Id. at 942.
65. Id. at 945.
66. 416 F. Supp. 627 (E.D.N.Y. 1976).
67. Id. at 628. These requirements were set forth in the former federal ma-
terial witness provision which read in full:
If it appears by affidavit that the testimony of a person is material in any
criminal proceeding, and if it is shown that it may become impracticable to secure
his presence by subpoena, a judicial officer shall impose conditions of re-
lease pursuant to section 3146 [18 U.S.C. § 3146]. No material witness
shall be detained because of inability to comply with any condition of
release if the testimony of such witness can adequately be secured by
deposition, and further detention is not necessary to prevent a failure
ofjustice. Release may be delayed for a reasonable period of time until
the deposition of the witness can be taken pursuant to the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure.
18 U.S.C. § 3149 (1970) (repealed 1984) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 3144
(1988)) (emphasis added).
68. Feingold, 416 F. Supp. at 628.
69. Id. at 629.
70. Id. Both the. former federal material witness provision in effect when
Feingold was arrested and detained, and the present material witness provision,
require that an affidavit must be filed which shows that the testimony of the wit-
ness is both "material" and "impracticable to secure." 18 U.S.C. § 3144 (1988);
18 U.S.C. § 3149 (1970) (repealed 1984).
71. Feingold, 416 F. Supp. at 629. Responding to Feingold's allegation that
the probable cause element had not been met because he had not ever "actually
disobeyed a subpoena," the court held that such a showing was not necessary to
support the second prong of the probable cause test. Id. at 628.
72. Id. at 629. Feingold would most likely have been able to procure his
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2. Allegations of Eighth Amendment Violations
The eighth amendment provides that: "Excessive bail shall not be
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punish-
ments inflicted."'7 3 Constitutional challenges pursuant to the eighth
amendment are supported by the fact that, the requirement of bail itself
is generally considered the most severe condition to impose upon a wit-
ness.7 4 For example, both the federal statute, and the Tennessee statute
under which Clyde White was detained, provide for the setting of bail as
a last option.75 A material witness may move, however, for the reduc-
tion of bail on the grounds that the bail is excessive and thus violative of
the eighth amendment. 76 Such motions are usually raised by counsel
and are most prevalent in cases involving indigent witnesses. 7 7 In addi-
tion, a witness can directly challenge his detention on the grounds that it
is cruel and unusual if, for example, he has been held for an unreasona-
ble length of time. 78
It should be noted that in White JJ,79 White did allege eighth
amendment violations.8 0 The Sixth Circuit, however, quickly dismissed
release in accordance with the provisions of § 3149 of the Bail Reform Act of
1966. 18 U.S.C. § 3149 (1970) (repealed 1984) (current version at 18 U.S.C.
§ 3144 (1988)). This statute mandated the release of any witness being detained
as a result of his inability to post the bond set by the court provided that the
government could "adequately" document his testimony by deposition. Id.
(statute read, "No material witness shall be detained because of an inability to
comply with any condition of release if the testimony of such witness can ade-
quately be secured by deposition . . . "). Not all state material witness provi-
sions, however, provide similar treatment or protection. For example, the
Tennessee provision simply states that, in the situation where a witness cannot
afford bail, the court, "may order his release if he has been detained for an un-
reasonable length of time, and may modify at any time the requirement as to
bail." TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-11-110 (1990) (emphasis added). Because these
provisions are discretionary they provide no guarantees that an indigent witness
will be released. For the text of other state statutes, see supra notes 25, 39 and
infra notes 199 & 239.
73. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
74. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-11-116 (1990).
75. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(B)(xii) (1988). This statute further states that:
"The judicial officer may not impose a financial condition that results in the
pretrial detention of a person." 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(2). See TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 40-11-116 (1990) (listing "deposit of bail" as last potential condition imposed
upon witness' release).
76. See, e.g., People ex rel. Richards v. Warden of City Prison, 277 A.D. 87,
98 N.Y.S.2d 173 (1950) (court reduced $100,000 bail to $10,000 pursuant to
state constitutional provision similar to eighth amendment).
77. For a discussion of the eighth amendment and claims of excessive bail,
particularly in the state system, see Comment, supra note 39, at 511.
78. See White H, 892 F.2d at 460 (wherein White alleged his extended incar-
ceration amounted to "cruel and inhumane treatment").
79. 892 F.2d 457 (6th Cir. 1989). For an explanation of what is referred to
as White I and White H, see supra note 1.
80. White H, 892 F.2d at 464. For the text of the eighth amendment, see
text accompanying supra note 73.
[Vol. 36: p. 597
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White's claim without rendering substantive support for its decision.8 l
3. The Due Process Requirements of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
a. The Liberty Interest
In those cases that offer a comprehensive evaluation of material wit-
ness statutes, the courts have determined which procedural due process
protections a material witness is guaranteed. 8 2 The due process clause
of the fifth amendment applicable to federal proceedings provides that
"[n]o person shall... be... deprived of life, liberty, or property, with-
out due process of law."' 83 Due process is also guaranteed in state pro-
ceedings pursuant to the fourteenth amendment.8 4 Issues such as a
witness' liberty interests, his right to be heard, and his right to be repre-
sented by counsel have been raised, often successfully, by detained ma-
terial witnesses in both federal and state proceedings. 85 In evaluating
the administration of material witness legislation, courts have analyzed
what process is due in the treatment of material witnesses and also
which rights guaranteed by the fifth amendment due process clause are
incorporated in the fourteenth amendment, and therefore applicable to
state proceedings.8 6 This analysis is especially crucial when a witness'
81. White II, 892 F.2d at 464.
82. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (evaluating minimum due
process requirements in civil proceeding); United States v. Eufracio-Torres, 890
F.2d 266 (10th Cir. 1989) (court balanced defendant's sixth amendment rights
against witness' fifth amendment due process rights); Application of Cochran,
434 F. Supp. 1207 (D. Neb. 1977) (reviewing due process concerns upon seizure
of material witnesses). For a discussion of Eufracio-Torres, see infra notes 104-07,
135-37 and accompanying text.
83. U.S. CONST. amend V. For the text of the fifth amendment, see supra
note 30.
84. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The fourteenth amendment, pertaining to
the requirement of due process in the state systems, reads in pertinent part:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privi-
leges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws.
Id.
85. See, e.g., Cochran, 434 F. Supp. 1207 (reviewing what process is due
when material witnesses are seized); see also United States v. Finkielstain, No. 89
Cr. 0009 (S.D.N.Y. April 17, 1989) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Courts file) (recog-
nizing that prolonged detention raises "humanitarian, if not due process consid-
erations"); United States v. Lehder-Rivas, No. 81-82-Cr-J-12 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 18,
1987) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Courts file) (federal material witness statute
"clearly recognizes that the rights of the material witness are to be considered
whenever an individual is arrested"). For a discussion of Cochran in relation to
the assistance of counsel and due process, see infra notes 238-41 and accompa-
nying text.
86. For a discussion of due process in state material witness proceedings,
see Cochran, 434 F. Supp. 1207. For a discussion of Cochran, see infra notes 93-
100, 238-41 and accompanying text.
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liberty and freedom are to be restrained or removed indefinitely by the
court in the interest of securing a criminal defendant a fair trial.
The United States Supreme Court, in Morrissey v. Brewer,8 7 set forth
a general analysis to determine what process was due where the petition-
ers had challenged the revocation of their parole as a restraint on their
liberty.8 8 In a comprehensive evaluation of the requirements of due
process, the Court stated that to determine "[w]hether any procedural
protections are due depends on the extent to which an individual will be
'condemned to suffer grievous loss.' ",89 Continuing, the Court recog-
nized that "[t]he question is not merely the 'weight' of the individual's
interest, but whether the nature of the interest is within the contempla-
tion of the 'liberty or property' language of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment." 90 Holding that the petitioners were entitled to the minimum
requirements of due process, 91 the Court concluded that "[b]y whatever
name.., liberty is valuable and must be seen as within the protection of
the Fourteenth Amendment." '9 2
In Application of Cochran,95 the United States District Court for the
87. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
88. Id. at 488-89. The Court stated in Morrissey that the "minimum require-
ments of due process" include the following:
(a) written notice of the claimed violations of parole; (b) disclosure to
the parolee of evidence against him; (c) opportunity to be heard in per-
son and to present witnesses and documentary evidence; (d) the right
to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing
officer specifically finds good cause for not allowing confrontation); (e)
a "neutral and detached" hearing body such as a traditional parole
board, members of which need not be judicial officers or lawyers; and
(f) a written statement by the factfinders as to the evidence relied on
and reasons for revoking parole.
Id. at 489. However, the Court did not "decide the question whether the pa-
rolee is entitled to the assistance of retained counsel or to appointed counsel if
he is indigent." Id. (footnote omitted). Four years later, in Mathews v. Eldridge,
the Supreme Court relied on its decision in Morrissey wherein it stated that
"[D]ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the partic-
ular situation demands." 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976) (quoting Morrissey, 408 U.S.
at 481). Based in part on this premise, the Court set forth "three distinct fac-
tors" required by due process. Id. at 335. For a discussion of Mathews and the
factors set forth therein, see infra note 99 and accompanying text.
89. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 481 (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Commit-
tee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)). For a
discussion of Justice Frankfurter's opinion on the right to be heard, see infra
note 137 and accompanying text.
90. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 481 (citing Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972)).
91. For a discussion of 4pplication of Cochran applying the due process analy-
sis set forth in Morrissey to a material witness statute, see supra notes 93-100, 238-
41 and accompanying text.
92. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 482. In his concurring opinion in Morrissey, Justice
Brennan, although agreeing with the Court in its evaluation of the due process
clause, argued that along with other due process rights, a witness also has a right
to the assistance of counsel. Id. at 491 (Brennan, J., concurring).
93. 434 F. Supp. 1207 (D. Neb. 1977).
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District of Nebraska reviewed the rights of a witness detained pursuant
to the Nebraska material witness provision,9 4 and held that "due process
protections do attach whenever the state physically seizes a person and
then commits him to complete custodial detention for an extended pe-
riod of time." 9 5 The Cochran court, in evaluating the petitioners' liberty
interests, applied the minimum due process analysis set forth by the
Supreme Court in Morrissey.9 6 The court went on to hold that "each of
the six procedural safeguards specified in Morrissey is applicable to the
[material witness] cases."'9 7 The Cochran court listed these procedural
safeguards as follows:
1. Written notice of the allegations upon which the state re-
lied for its claim of a right to require a recognizance or de-
tention and of the time and place of the hearing on those
allegations;
2. Disclosure at a hearing of the evidence in support of the
state's claim;
3. An opportunity to be heard in person and to present wit-
nesses and documentary evidence;
4. To the effect that it is practicable, the right to confront and
cross-examine witnesses;
5. A hearing before a magistrate or other judicial officer; and
6. A written statement by the decision maker as to the evi-
94. For the text of the Nebraska material witness provisions, see infra note
239.
95. Cochran, 434 F. Supp. at 1212. The court in Cochran stated that,
although the fourth amendment requirement of probable cause has been ap-
plied to the seizure and arrest of material witnesses, the issue of whether the
"Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies to the detention of
material witnesses has not been considered by the Supreme Court of the United
States." Id. Hence, the court examined "analogous situations" in which the lib-
erty of a person has been restrained and the due process protections have at-
tached. Id. at 1212-13. The Cochran court concluded that the petitioners' due
process rights had been violated because they were being held without adequate
notice as to the state's basis for authorizing their detention. Id. at 1216. Fur-
thermore, the court concluded that the witnesses had lacked adequate represen-
tation, a "crucial element of due process." Id. at 1214.
The Cochran court noted Supreme Court cases involving due process rights
of petitioners in civil proceedings. Id. at 1212 n. 11 (citing In re Gault, 387 U.S.
1, 30-31 (1957)) (due process protection in juvenile proceedings); O'Connor v.
Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 576 (1975) (petitioner's "constitutional right to free-
dom" violated upon involuntary confinement to mental hospital)). For refer-
ences to civil cases in which due process protections have been held to be
applicable, see, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); Morrissey v.
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (addressing issue of due process requirements in
context of revocation of parole). For a discussion of the requirements of due
process according to the Supreme Court in both Mathews and Morrissey, see supra
note 88 and accompanying text.
96. Cochran, 434 F. Supp. at 1213-15. For the factors set forth by the
Supreme Court in Morrissey, see supra note 88 and accompanying text.
97. Cochran, 434 F. Supp. at 1213.
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dence relied upon and the reasons for any adverse
decision.9 8
The court's conclusion that these factors were to be applied to the
arrest and detention of material witnesses stemmed from three due pro-
cess considerations: (1) the witness' liberty interest; (2) the "risk of an
erroneous deprivation of such interest"; and (3) the procedural burdens
on the state in light of its interest in "securing essential testimony in
criminal trials." 99 Weighing these competing interests, the Cochran
court found that, due to the absence of due process safeguards, the peti-
tioner had been unconstitutionally incarcerated. 10 0
b. The Balancing Test
Other courts have emphasized and attempted to resolve the conflict
between the rights of the witness in maintaining his unrestricted free-
dom and those of the defendant in maintaining his right to cross-ex-
amine the witness.' 0 ' On the one hand, the liberty interests of the
material witness may be at stake, especially if the witness is unable to
post bail and is consequently incarcerated pending the defendant's
trial.10 2 Conversely, the defendant's rights under the sixth amendment
may also be jeopardized if the witness is released and consequently fails
98. Id. at 1214. The Cochran court adapted its six factor test from the test
applied by the Supreme Court in Morrissey v. Brewer, 424 U.S. 471, 489 (1976).
99. Id. at 1213-14. These three factors were also relied upon by the court
in Class Action Application for Habeas Corpus, 612 F. Supp. 940 (W.D. Tex.
1985), to support its argument that material witnesses detained for purposes of
preserving their testimony for trial retained due process rights including the
right to the assistance of counsel. See infra notes 131-34. The three factors used
by the court in Class Action, relied on by the court in Cochran to establish its due
process argument, and originally set forth in Mathews v. Eldgridge are as follows:
First, the private interests that will be affected by the official action;
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through
the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the government's inter-
est, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative
burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirements
would entail.
Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
100. Cochran, 434 F. Supp. at 1216. The Cochran court, in holding that the
petitioner's due process rights had been violated, stated that the petitioner had
neither received written notice of the allegations against him nor had he been
given any written notice of the reasons for the "adverse decisions" upon which
his detention was based. Id. The court also raised the due process issue in rela-
tion to the petitioner's right to the assistance of counsel. Id. at 1214-15.
101. For a discussion of a decision by the United States Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit which addressed this conflict, see infra notes 104-07, 135-
37 and accompanying text.
102. See, e.g., White H, 892 F.2d 457 (White remained incarcerated for 288
days because he could not afford bail). For a discussion of earlier cases dealing
with the prolonged detention of material witnesses and the problems of remedy-
ing such situations, see Carlson, supra note 39; Comment, supra note 39.
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to appear and testify at the defendant's trial. 10 3
In United States v. Eufracio-Torres,10 4 the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Tenth Circuit, discussing alternatives to a witness' pro-
longed detention, emphasized the "clash between the defendant's sixth
amendment rights to confrontation and the witnesses' fifth amendment
rights to due process."' 0 5 Within one month of the witnesses' deten-
tion, the court, concerned with the witnesses' unnecessarily prolonged
detention, granted a motion by the government to depose the wit-
nesses.10 6 The Tenth Circuit, in response to the defendant's challenge
regarding the use of the depositions at trial, weighed the interests of
both parties and stated that, "the balance tips toward the fifth amend-
ment interests of the witnesses, and the government was reasonable in
moving to depose and release the witnesses." 10 7
103. See United States v. Guadian-Salazar, 824 F.2d 344, 347 (5th Cir.
1987) (conviction reversed as deprivation of sixth amendment right to confront
witnesses was "fatally prejudicial" due to inconsistency between deposition and
earlier statements). For a discussion of a defendant's sixth amendment rights in
a criminal proceeding, see supra note 16, 48-50 and accompanying text.
104. 890 F.2d 266 (10th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1306 (1990).
105. Id. at 269. The facts of this case are not uncommon. The defendant
was arrested for transporting illegal aliens into the United States. Id. at 267.
The seven passengers were detained as material witnesses in accordance with
the federal material witness statute. Id.
106. Id. at 268. The defendant opposed the government's motion to re-
lease the witnesses following the deposition procedures. Id. The defendant
claimed that "the government had failed to demonstrate 'exceptional circum-
stances' warranting depositions because the government failed to show that the
witnesses would not appear at trial if released unconditionally." Id. (quoting
Appellee's Brief at 4). The court, however, found that it was not error for the
trial court to have granted the government's motion to have the witnesses' depo-
sitions secured prior to their release. Id. at 271. The court reached this conclu-
sion by reviewing the witnesses' fifth amendment due process rights along with
the defendant's sixth amendment right "to be confronted with the witnesses
against him." Id. at 268-71. The court resolved this conflict of interest in favor
of the witnesses' procedural due process rights. Id. at 271.
Furthermore, before the witnesses were released they were served with sub-
poenas, and each witness indicated that he would return to the United States to
testify at the defendant's trial. Id. at 268. At trial, the government filed a "No-
tice of Intention to Use [the witnesses'] Depositions." Id.
107. Id. at 270 (quoting unreported district court opinion). At issue were
the rights of seven witnesses and one defendant. Balancing these interests, the
court stated:
On the one hand, the witnesses have a strong constitutional interest in
not being detained when charged with no crimes. Significantly, the de-
fendant, who was charged with a crime, was released on bond, whereas
the witnesses, who were not charged-a circumstance not atypical of
illegal transportation of aliens cases-were detained for more than six
weeks. On the other hand, the defendant has an interest in confronta-
tion at trial. Although the deposition testimony did infringe on this
interest, the depositions were trustworthy and allowed the defendant to
challenge the witnesses' statements. The witnesses were told that they
could be criminally charged if they lied. The defendant, through coun-
sel, was afforded the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses during
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c. Due Process and the Right to Be Heard
i. The History of the Supreme Court's Analysis Regarding the
Necessity of Effective Representation
The constitutionality of material witness provisions has been chal-
lenged with respect to the lack of effective representation and the corre-
sponding right to be heard in a meaningful manner.10 8 The issue of
court-appointed counsel as a necessary requirement of due process has
been discussed at length by the United States Supreme Court with re-
spect to indigent criminal defendants. ' 0 9 In the landmark case of Gideon
v. Wainwright, 10 the Supreme Court faced the issue of whether an indi-
gent criminal defendant had the right to appointed counsel under the
fourteenth amendment. I I ' In reviewing whether the fourteenth amend-
ment incorporated the sixth amendment right to counsel, the Court de-
scribed the right to counsel as "fundamental" and stated that "any
the depositions. Further, the depositions were postponed until the de-
fendant could travel to Kansas City to be present.
Id. (quoting unreported district court opinion).
108. See Class Action Application for Habeas Corpus, 612 F. Supp. 940
(W.D. Tex. 1985); see also infra notes 109-27, 222-41 and accompanying text,
discussing the relationship between the due process clause and the right to ef-
fective representation by counsel.
109. See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979) (actual imprisonment and
constitutional right to counsel); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972)
(counsel required if defendant suffers incarceration); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335 (1963) (discussing right to counsel under fourteenth amendment as
applicable to state proceedings).
110. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). For a discussion of the Court's analysis in Gideon,
see infra notes 111-13 and accompanying text.
111. Id. at 341-45. In Gideon, the Court reviewed its decision in Betts v.
Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), wherein an indigent defendant challenged his state
conviction as violative of the fourteenth amendment and due process because he
had been denied the assistance of counsel. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 338-39. In Betts,
the Court concluded that
due process [was] "a concept less rigid and more fluid than those envis-
aged in other specific and particular provisions of the Bill of Rights"
[and] ... held that refusal to appoint counsel under the particular facts
and circumstances ... w[as] not so "offensive to the common and fun-
damental ideas of fairness" as to amount to a denial of due process.
Gideon, 372 U.S. at 339 (quoting Betts, 319 U.S. at 462, 473). The Court in Betts,
after a review of the judicial history of the states, had determined that the "ap-
pointment of counsel [was] not a fundamental right, essential to a fair trial."
Betts, 316 U.S. at 471. The Gideon Court did not follow this line of reasoning and
instead held that the sixth amendment right to counsel was applicable to the
states through the fourteenth amendment because the right to counsel was in
fact fundamental. 372 U.S. at 344-45. In so holding, the Court stated:
From the very beginning, our state and national constitutions and laws
have laid great emphasis on procedural and substantive safeguards
designed to assure fair trials before impartial tribunals in which every
defendant stands equal before the law. This noble ideal cannot be real-
ized if the poor man charged with crime has to face his accusers without
a lawyer to assist him.
Id. at 344.
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person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be
assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him.""12 Because "a
provision of the Bill of Rights which is 'fundamental and essential to a
fair trial' is made obligatory upon the States by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment," it necessarily followed that the right to appointed counsel should
be constitutionally guaranteed in state criminal proceedings. 1 13
Almost ten-years later, in Argersinger v. Hamlin,"14 the Court ex-
panded on its earlier holding in Gideon and held that "no person may be
imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or
felony, unless he was represented by counsel at his trial."1 5 The fact
that incarceration activated the constitutional guarantee of representa-
tion manifests the Court's belief that the destruction of one's physical
liberty triggers compelling due process interests. In 1979, in Scott v. Illi-
nois,116 the Supreme Court "resolve[d] a conflict among state and lower
federal courts regarding the proper application of ... [its] decision in
Argersinger v. Hamlin." 1 17 The Court explained its holding in Argersinger
as follows:
[W]e believe that the central premise of Argersinger-that actual
imprisonment is a penalty different in kind from fines or the
mere threat of imprisonment-is eminently sound and warrants
adoption of actual imprisonment as the line defining the consti-
tutional right to appointment of counsel .... We therefore hold
that the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution require only that no indigent criminal de-
fendant be sentenced to a term of imprisonment unless the
State has afforded him the right to assistance of appointed
counsel in his defense. 18
In In re Gault the Court relied on this premise in deciding whether
there existed a corresponding right to counsel in certain civil con-
112. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344.
113. Id. at 342 (quoting Betts, 316 U.S. at 465). In Gideon, the Court quoted
Gorsjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 243-44 (1936), wherein the
Court had stated:
We concluded that certain fundamental rights, safeguarded by the first
eight amendments against federal action, were also safeguarded against
state action by the due process of law clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, and among them the fundamental right of the accused to the aid
of counsel in a criminal prosecution.
Gideon, 372 U.S. at 343 (quoting Gorsjean, 297 U.S. at 243-44).
114. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
115. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972) (emphasis added). For
a discussion of the Court's decision in Argersinger and later cases, see Duke, The
Right to Appointed Counsel: Argersinger and Beyond, 12 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 601
(1975).
116. 440 U.S. 367 (1979).
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texts. 1 9 The Court stated that where a "juvenile's freedom is cur-
tailed" the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment mandates
that "the child and his parents must be notified of the child's right to be
represented by counsel retained by them, or if they are unable to afford
counsel, that counsel will be appointed to represent the child."° 2 0 Simi-
larly, in Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 12 1 the petitioner, who was
subject to a civil parental termination hearing, argued that she was enti-
tled to the assistance of appointed counsel pursuant to the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment. 12 2 Relying on the decisions in
Gideon, 1 23 Argersinger,124 In re Gault,12 5 and Scott, 1 26 the Supreme Court
stated:
In sum, the Court's precedents speak with one voice about
what "fundamental fairness" has meant when the Court has
considered the right to appointed counsel, and we thus draw
from them the presumption that an indigent litigant has a right
to appointed counsel only when, if he loses, he may be de-
prived of his physical liberty. It is against this presumption that
all the other elements in the due process decision must be
measured. ' 2 7
119. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
120. Id. at 41.
121. 452 U.S. 18 (1981); see also Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980) (pro-
posed transfer to state mental hospital entitled prisoner to representation by
counsel).
122. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 24. The Court in Lassiter held that in some circum-
stances appointed counsel is required in parental tertnination hearings, but that
"the decision whether due process calls for the appointment of counsel for indi-
gent parents in termination proceedings [is] to be answered in the first instance
by the trial court, subject, of course, to appellate review." Id. at 32.
123. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). For a discussion of
Gideon, see supra notes 110-13 and accompanying text.
124. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972). For a discussion of
Argersinger, see supra notes 114-18 and accompanying text.
125. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). For a discussion of In Re Gault, see
supra notes 119-20 and accompanying text.
126. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979). For a discussion of Scott, see
supra notes 116-18 and accompanying text.
127. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 26-27. The United States District Court for the
Northern District of Ohio relied on Lassiter in deciding whether due process re-
quired counsel in a "civil" proceeding held in a domestic relations court. John-
son v. Zurz, 596 F. Supp 39, 45 (N.D. Ohio 1984). The Johnson court held:
[W]here an indigent is ordered to appear and show cause why he
should not be held in contempt of court for failure to pay child support
and is subject to incarceration, due process requires that the indigent
be informed of his right to appointed counsel and, after inquiry and
upon request, such counsel be appointed before the indigent appears
to answer the show cause order.
Id. at 46. In so holding, the court considered the interests at stake and stated
that: "Physical liberty is and has been of vital interest to the people of the
United States from the time of our founding fathers. That this liberty interest
622
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Since these decisions, the actual deprivation of liberty in either the crim-
inal or civil context has remained the central focus in determining
whether the sixth amendment right to counsel attaches.
ii. The Bail Reform Act of 1984
Section 3142 of the Bail Reform Act provides for the assistance of
counsel at a witness' detention hearing, during which the court deter-
mines what conditions, if any, should be imposed upon the witness to
assure his attendance at trial.1 28 This section also requires that if the
witness is unable to afford an attorney, one shall be appointed for him
by the court.' 2 9 Often it is this appointed counsel who will procure the
may only be taken from an individual with due process of law is fundamental to
our system of government." Id.
The crucial difference between the plaintiffs' circumstances in Lassiter and
Johnson was that the "the actual possibility of incarceration" existed in Johnson
where no such possibility existed in Lassiter. Johnson, 596 F. Supp. at 45-46. The
Court in Lassiter recognized that in some instances due process required the ap-
pointment of counsel in a parental termination hearing where "the parent's in-
terests were at their strongest, the State's interests at their weakest, and the risks
of error were at their peak ...." Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 31. Yet, the Court recog-
nized "that the Constitution [would not] require[] the appointment of counsel in
every parental termination proceeding." Id. The Court therefore concluded
that the trial court must review each case individually, taking into consideration
those factors enunciated in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1975), to deter-
mine whether due process would require appointed representation. Lassiter, 452
U.S at 27, 31-32 (citing Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335). The plaintiff inJohnson, how-
ever, was "faced with incarceration" and therefore the "liberty interests involved
far outweigh[ed] the interests of the state." Johnson, 596 F. Supp. at 46. In this
situation, regardless of whether the proceeding is civil or criminal, the right to
counsel attaches. Id.
For a further discussion of Mathews, see supra note 99 and accompanying
text. The Mathews factors, discussed above, were listed as follows by the
Supreme Court:
First, the private interests that will be affected by the official action;
second, the risk of erroneous deprivation of such interests through the
procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substi-
tute procedural safeguards; and finally, the government's interest, in-
cluding the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens
that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.
Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
128. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f) (1988).
129. Id. See, e.g., United States v. Rivera, 859 F.2d 1204, 1205 (4th Cir.
1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1020 (1989). In Rivera, counsel was appointed for
detained material witnesses. Because counsel had been appointed for the wit-
nesses, they were able to move for an order that their depositions be taken pur-
suant to 18 U.S.C. § 3144 and Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure. Id. at 1205. Furthermore, § 3144 states not only that "[n]o material
witness may be detained because of inability to comply with any conditions of
release if the testimony of such witness can adequately be secured by deposition
... " but also that a witness' detention may only "be delayed for a reasonable
period of time until the deposition of the witness can be taken." 18 U.S.C.
§ 3144. Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure authorizes the
taking of a witness' deposition under particular circumstances. For a discussion
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release of the witness by moving either to have the witness deposed or
the bail reduced in light of the witness' circumstances.1 30
In 1985, the issue of mandatory representation pursuant to the Bail
Reform Act was first discussed in Class Action Application for Habeas
Corpus. 131 The question before the United States District Court for the
Western District of Texas was whether material witnesses, then being
held pursuant to section 3144 of the Bail Reform Act, were "entitled to
representation by counsel at the time that the determination to hold
them as material witnesses [was] made and during the time of their in-
carceration."1 3 2 As section 3144 of the Bail Reform Act had only re-
cently been enacted, the court addressed the changes instituted by the
new legislation. 13 Recognizing that section 3142(f) specifically re-
quires the appointment of counsel for those who cannot afford one, the
court stated that not only is the appointment of counsel mandated by
section 3142(f) of the Bail Reform Act, but also "that appointment of
counsel to represent material witnesses is required by the Fifth Amend-
ment to the Constitution."'13 4
The Tenth Circuit in United States v. Eufracio-Torres consistently
made reference to the witnesses' "right to be heard," stating that this
was "[t]he fundamental requirement of due process."' 35 Recognizing
of Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, see infra text accompa-
nying note 146.
130. See, e.g., United States v. Finkielstain, No. 89 Cr. 0009 (S.D.N.Y. April
17, 1989) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Courts file); Eufracio-Torres, 890 F.2d at 269;
see also Class Action Application for Habeas Corpus, 612 F. Supp. 940 (W.D.
Tex. 1985).
131. 612 F. Supp. 940 (W.D. Tex. 1985).
132. Id. at 942. Although the respondents agreed with the petitioners that
§ 3144 of the Bail Reform Act "provide[s] for the appointment of counsel for
persons arrested as material witnesses," they "remain[ed] steadfast in their con-
tention that they [were] unable to provide the relief sought by the Petitioners."
Id. at 942. The respondents' argument was based on the pretense that it was the
duty of the court to provide the relief sought by the incarcerated material wit-
nesses. Id.
133. Class Action, 612 F. Supp. at 942-43. The changes in the new material
witness statutes are as follows: "Section 3144 unambiguously provides that ma-
terial witnesses are to be treated in accordance with Title 18, United States
Code, Section 3142 which addresses the release of defendants prior to trial
[and] Section 3144 explicitly grants authority to a judicial officer to order the
arrest of a person as a material witness." Id. at 942 (citing Comprehensive
Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD-
MIN. NEWS (98 Stat.) 3182, 3211-12).
134. Id. at 943-44 (emphasis added). For a discussion of the protection
counsel can provide for a witness detained pursuant to a material witness stat-
ute, see infra notes 222-41 and accompanying text.
135. Eufracio-Torres, 890 F.2d 266, 270 (10th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S.
Ct. 1306 (1990) (citing Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 540 (1981)). For a fur-
ther discussion of the right to counsel, see infra notes 222-41 and accompanying
text. It should also be noted that one of the changes made to the federal mate-
rial witness provisions, as part of the Bail Reform Act of 1984, was the additional
protection of the right to be represented by counsel. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)
[Vol. 36: p. 597624
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that the detention of a material witness was considered a civil proceed-
ing and therefore the sixth amendment right to counsel would not nor-
mally attach,' 36 the Tenth Circuit quoted the United States Supreme
Court which stated that, "the 'right to be heard before being con-
demned to suffer grievous loss of any kind, even though it may not in-
volve the stigma and hardships of a criminal conviction, is a principle
basic to our society.' ",137 This principle supports the conclusion that a
material witness must be afforded the representation of counsel in ac-
cordance with the fifth amendment, above and beyond the requirement
of representation set forth in section 3142(f).138
Based on the authorities cited above, it is evident that a material
witness faces the genuine risk of being deprived of his fifth amendment
due process rights in order to ensure a criminal defendant's sixth
amendment right to a fair trial. Though many witnesses may be released
on their own recognizance or subject to restrictive conditions, witnesses
who are incarcerated without effective representation may remain incar-
cerated for unreasonable lengths of time. The legislatures have pro-
vided the courts with the power to detain a material witness and have
often set forth detailed procedures and options for the courts to fol-
low.' 39 If a court, however, fails to properly consider the legislature's
mandates and fails to make the relevant inquiries and investigations into
the witness' circumstances, an innocent witness is left with no recourse
by which to free himself. 140
D. The Difficulties of Remedying a Wrongful Incarceration in Both the Federal
and State Systems
1. Remedies Available During Incarceration
a. Writs of Habeas Corpus
Generally, a witness who has been detained pursuant to either a
state or federal material witness provision will not be successful in bring-
ing a civil action against the judicial officers responsible for his incarcer-
ation once he has been released from jail. 14 1 If, however, the witness is
(1988). This section further provides that counsel will be appointed if the wit-
ness cannot afford to retain counsel on his own. Id.
136. Eufracio-Torres, 890 F.2d at 270.
137. Id. (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341
U.S. 123, 168 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
138. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f (1988). For a further discussion of the right to
counsel and the corresponding due process concerns, see supra notes 109-27
and infra notes 222-41 and accompanying text.
139. For the relevant Tennessee and federal statutes, see supra notes 3 & 26
respectively.
140. See, e.g., United States v. Finkielstain, No. 89 Cr. 0009 (S.D.N.Y. April
17, 1989) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Courts file); Application of Cochran, 434 F.
Supp. 1207 (D. Neb. 1977).
141. For a discussion of the problems surrounding the effects of judicial
immunity on civil proceedings, see infra notes 155-61 and accompanying text.
1991] NOTE 625
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given the opportunity and the means, he may seek a writ of habeas
corpus and attack the validity of his detention while he is
incarcerated. 142
Through this type of collateral attack, the witness may choose to
challenge his incarceration as violative of either his fourth, fifth, eighth
or fourteenth amendment rights, 143 or as part of a motion requesting
that the court order a deposition proceeding.' 4 4 Under these circum-
stances, the witness' immediate release would be the remedy sought.
Yet a witness who lacks the assistance of counsel will often be left with-
out the legal means or knowledge to initiate such an action himself. The
prolonged incarceration of Clyde White manifests the problems a wit-
ness faces without adequate representation.14 5
b. Federal Deposition Procedures for Material Witnesses
The federal rule regarding the taking of depositions in criminal
cases reads as follows:
Whenever due to exceptional circumstances of the case it is in
the interest of justice that the testimony of a prospective wit-
ness of a party be taken and preserved for use at trial, the court
may upon motion of such party and notice to the parties order
that testimony of such witness be taken by deposition .... If a
witness is detained pursuant to section 3144 of title 18, United
States Code, the court on written motion of the witness and
upon notice to the parties may direct that the witness' deposi-
tion be taken. After the deposition has been subscribed the
court may discharge the witness. 146
Witnesses detained pursuant to the federal material witness provi-
142. See, e.g., Class Action Application for Habeas Corpus, 612 F. Supp.
940; Cochran, 434 F. Supp. 1207 (W.D. Tex. 1985). But see In re Rankin, 330
Mich. 91, 47 N.W.2d 28 (1951) (writ dismissed because of witness' prior disap-
pearance and false testimony).
143. Class Action, 612 F. Supp. 940 (fifth amendment due process requires
appointment of counsel to all material witnesses); Cochran, 434 F. Supp. 1207
(through writ of habeas corpus, petitioner successfully raised claims of due pro-
cess violations); In re Rankin, 330 Mich. 91, 47 N.W.2d 28 (contesting excessive
bail); People ex rel. Gross v. Sheriff of New York, 277 A.D. 546, 101 N.Y.S.2d 271
(1950) (through writ of habeas corpus, petitioner contested excessive bail and
unreasonable detention).
144. See, e.g., United States v. Rivera, 859 F.2d 1204 (4th Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 490 U.S. 1020 (1989) (after remaining in custody for three weeks, deposi-
tions ordered upon motion of counsel pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3144 and FED. R.
Civ. P. 15(a)); United States v. Linton, 502 F. Supp. 878 (D. Nev. 1980) (motion
pursuant to § 3149 granted ordering witness' deposition and release on per-
sonal recognizance).
145. For a discussion of White's dilemma when his request for counsel was
denied, see infra notes 162-82 and accompanying text.
146. FED. R. CRIM. P. 15(a).
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sions can generally, upon motion by counsel, secure their release if the
court deems it is "in the interests ofjustice" to take the witness' deposi-
tion and release him from custody.' 4 7 For example, in United States v.
Finkielstain,'48 the court ordered that the deposition of a material wit-
ness be taken as an alternative to detention under section 3144 of the
Bail Reform Act.149 In reaching this decision, pursuant to Rule 15 of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and section 3142 of the Bail
Reform Act, the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York stated that the witness' detention "without charge for close to
three months raises humanitarian, if not due process considera-
tions."' 5 ° Although it was fairly certain that the witness, if released,
would return to Uruguay before the trial, thereby making it impossible
to secure his attendance at a later date, the court reasoned that it was "in
the interests of justice" to depose the witness rather than detain him in
the United States for an indefinite period of time.1 5 1
Similarly, the United States District Court for the District of Ne-
vada, in United States v. Linton, 152 granted a witness' motion requesting
that the court order his deposition and release him upon his personal
recognizance.15 3 In Linton, the court felt that because the petitioner was
147. Id. For a discussion of cases in which the witness' release was obtained
following deposition procedures, see infra note 225 and accompanying text.
In determining whether to grant a motion ordering depositions, the court
must consider the sixth amendment rights of the defendant. See supra notes 48-
50. Interpreting the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment, the United
States Supreme Court has held that in order to utilize a witness' deposition
against a defendant in a criminal proceeding, "the government must demon-
strate that it made a good faith effort using reasonable means to obtain declar-
ant's presence at trial." United States v. Eufracio-Torres, 890 F.2d 266, 269
(10th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1306 (1990).
148. No. 89 Cr. 0009 (S.D.N.Y. April 17, 1989) (LEXIS, Genfed library,
Courts file).
149. Id. at 2-3. For the text of § 3144 of the Bail Reform Act, which pro-
vides for material witness detention, and Rule 15(a), which provides deposition
procedures, see supra note 26 and the text accompanying note 146, respectively.
150. Finkielstain, No. 89 Cr. 0009 at 2. The three months detention refers
to the period of time the witness would be incarcerated if the court proceeded
under the material witness provisions as opposed to ordering his deposition.
There have been many cases in which the courts have, upon motion from either
the prosecution, defense, or the material witness' counsel, granted approval to
depose a material witness in custody so his release could be secured. See United
States v. Lehder-Rivas, No. 81-82-Cr-J-12 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 18, 1987) (LEXIS,
Genfed library, Courts file) (motion for deposition of material witness granted
and conditions for release "modified to allow him to leave the United States and
return to his home in South Caicos, Turks and Caicos Islands"); United States v.
Francisco-Romandia, 503 F.2d 1020, 1021 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S.
910 (1975) (release of 20 material witnesses following deposition procedures
was not an "abuse of discretion").
151. Finkielstain, No. 89 Cr. 0009 at 2-3.
152. 502 F. Supp. 878 (D. Nev. 1980).
153. Linton, 502 F. Supp. at 878. The petitioner's motion was made pursu-
ant to the former federal material witness legislation. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C.
1991] 627NOTE
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presently in custody and had been incarcerated for approximately two
months, "exceptional circumstances" warranted the taking of his depo-
sition and releasing him from custody.' 54
2. Judicial Immunity as a Barrier to a Successful Post-Incarceration Remedy
Beyond the constitutional issues raised by White, judicial immunity
worked to secure the dismissal of White's section 1983 claim against the
judicial officer and agents of the City of Chattanooga. 155 The doctrine
of judicial immunity has been defined as: "The absolute protection
from civil liability arising out of the discharge ofjudicial functions which
every judge enjoys. Under [the] doctrine of 'judicial immunity,' a judge
is not subject to liability for any act committed within the exercise of his
judicial function.... .156 The Supreme Court has explained further
that:
This immunity applies even when the judge is accused of acting
maliciously and corruptly, and it "is not for the protection or
benefit of a malicious or corrupt judge, but for the benefit of
the public, whose interest it is that the judges should be at lib-
erty to exercise their functions with independence and without
fear of consequences."15 7
§ 3149 (1970) (repealed 1984) (current version at 18 U.S.C § 3144 (1988)).
Section 3149, now repealed, provided, as does today's federal material witness
legislation, that "[n]o material witness shall be detained because of his inability
to comply with any condition of release if the testimony of such witness can
adequately be secured by deposition, and further detention is not necessary to
prevent a failure of justice." 18 U.S.C. § 3149 (1970) (current version at 18
U.S.C. § 3144).
154. Linton, 502 F. Supp. at 879. The court ordered the petitioner's deposi-
tion to be taken and the petitioner was then released on specified conditions
including limitations on his travel liberties and the requirement that petitioner
notify the proper authorities if his address or phone number changed. Id. at
879-81. Furthermore, the court explicitly stated that although he was to give his
testimony by deposition and be released from custody, he was "not excused
from appearing at the trial if he [was] subpoenaed as a witness." Id. at 881.
155. White II, 892 F.2d at 461-64. In White II, the Sixth Circuit explicitly
held that so long as the judicial officers were acting in a quasi-judicial capacity,
such as setting bail, they were immune from civil liability. Id.
156. BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 848 (6th ed. 1990) (citing C.M. Clark Ins.
Agency, Inc. v. Reed, 390 F. Supp. 1056, 1060 (D.C. Tex. 1975)).
157. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967) (quoting Scott v. Stansfield, 3
L.R.-Ex. 220, 223 (1868), quoted in Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 349(1872)). The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit defined the
doctrines ofjudicial immunity similarly when it stated: "Provided that they do
not engage in non-judicial acts or act in the clear absence of all jurisdiction,judges presiding over courts of general jurisdiction are absolutely immune from
suits for damages even if they act erroneously, corruptly or in excess ofjurisdic-
tion." King v. Love, 766 F.2d 962, 965 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 971
(1985). The court also held that "judges of courts of limited jurisdiction are
absolutely immune from suits for damages if they act in excess ofjurisdiction but
do not act in absence of all jurisdiction." Id. at 967.
32
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 2 [1991], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol36/iss2/4
1991] NOTE 629
Quoting the United States Supreme Court, the Sixth Circuit further
noted that "the scope of [a] judge's jurisdiction must be construed
broadly where the issue is the immunity of the judge."' 5 8
The Supreme Court has held that by enacting section 1983 Con-
gress did not intend to "abolish the doctrine" of judicial immunity. 159
In addressing a section 1983 claim, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit explained that "government officials performing
discretionary functions, generally are shielded from liability for civil
damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established
[federal] statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
would have known."' 160 Because of this immunity, a witness generally
will not be able to hold ajudge civilly liable for his failure to comply with
statutory requirements.' 6 ' Hence, a witness may be left without a rem-
edy against a judicial officer who has required that the witness post bond
or has authorized the detention of the witness in a manner contrary to
the appropriate statutory authority.
Police officers are also entitled to a qualified immunity from civil suits when
they are performing discretionary acts. Pierson, 386 U.S. at 555-57 (holding "de-
fense of good faith and probable cause" available to police officers under
§ 1983); see also 1 CooK & SOBIESKI, CIVIL RIGHTS AcTIONS § 2.07 (1990) (in-
depth discussion of doctrine ofjudicial immunity and claims of civil rights viola-
tions under § 1983).
158. King, 766 F.2d at 965 (quoting Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356
(1978)). The court in King explained that an "act is non-judicial if it is not nor-
mally performed by a judicial officer or if the parties did not deal with the judge
in his official capacity." Id.
159. Pierson, 386 U.S. at 554-55.
160. Clark v. Link, 855 F.2d 156, 160 (4th Cir. 1988) (quoting Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).
161. See White H, 892 F.2d 457. In White H it was argued that the judicial
officials lacked the probable cause necessary to detain White, yet in fact he was
detained for 288 days. Id. at 463-64. When White challenged the judicial offi-
cials' actions, his appeal was dismissed pursuant to the determination that the
officials were immune from civil liability. Id. at 462-64.
King also exemplifies the difficulty faced by plaintiffs attempting to hold ju-
dicial officials liable for violations of civil rights. King, 766 F.2d 962. In King,
Judge Love appealed a verdict awarding plaintiff both compensatory and puni-
tive damages. Id. at 963. The plaintiff, King, had been seized pursuant to an
arrest warrant for his failure to appear at the appropriate time before the court
on a drunk driving charge. Id. Apparently, the individual actually stopped for
driving under the influence of alcohol, W.C. Anderson, had produced King's
lost license as identification and a ticket was made out in King's name. Id. Thus,
the arrest warrant erroneously named King as the person to be arrested. Id.
King "offered to explain the mistake" but Judge Love disregarded this at-
tempt to clear up the error of identification. Id. King was incarcerated from
March 4, until March 7, 1980, pursuant to a contempt charge issued by Judge
Love. Id. at 964. In summary, the court held that Judge Love was entitled to
absolute immunity under the circumstances as reviewed; therefore, King could
"not sue Judge Love for damages stemming from the March 4, 1980 incident."
Id. at 968.
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III. DISCUSSION
The facts of White's case and the Tennessee statute, from which the
judicial officers obtained the authority to detain White, are discussed
below. Although the Sixth Circuit's opinions give a fair amount of fac-
tual detail surrounding White's initial arrest and incarceration, neither
opinion offers much insight into the specific procedures followed by the
Tennessee judicial officers. For this reason, it is difficult to discern the
exact procedural application of the Tennessee material witness provi-
sions and whether the judicial officers conducted an investigation to de-
termine White's status as a material witness as prescribed by the
provisions.
A. White ex rel. Swafford v. Gerbitz
On October 11, 1984, Clyde White, a homeless man who lived on
the streets of Chattanooga, Tennessee, was found "intoxicated and
sleeping approximately fifteen to twenty feet from [the] body" of a man
who had been stabbed and beaten to death. 162 White was taken into
custody by the detective investigating the case who believed that White
had either committed the murder himself or witnessed the crime.' 6 3
While being interviewed by the detective, White stated that "he did not
want to be a 'snitch' and did not want to testify about the incident ....
-1s4 He also informed the detective at that time that he was home-
less.' 65 White then proceeded to describe to the detective the events he
had witnessed surrounding the murder.16 6 Subsequently, White was ar-
rested and detained as a " 'state's witness' to assure his testimony at
trial."1 6 7
The following day, White and the person White had named as the
murderer in his statement to the detective were brought before Judge
162. White II, 892 F.2d at 458, For another account of the facts surround-
ing White's arrest and detention, see White 1, 860 F.2d 661 (6th Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 489 U.S. 1028 (1989).
163. White I, 892 F.2d at 458.
164. Id. at 459. Although the court noted that White had told the detective
he did not want to be a "snitch," the court never addressed statements later
made by White which indicated that he would voluntarily appear at Denson's
trial. Id. In the 1988 decision arising out of this case, however, in which claims
against the four prosecuting attorneys were dismissed, a more detailed account
of White's detention appears. White 1, 860 F.2d at 662-63. In the 1988 decision,
the court dismissed White's action stating that White had "waived his federal
cause of action when he subsequently filed a similar claim before the Tennessee
Claims Commission." Id. at 664. In this account, it is recorded that White re-
peatedly assured the court that he would appear to testify at Denson's trial. Id.
at 663. For a discussion of the 1988 opinion, see infra notes 169-82, 191 and
accompanying text.
165. White I, 892 F.2d at 459.
166. Id.
167. Id.
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William Cox of the Chattanooga City Court.' 68 At this initial bond
hearing Judge Cox denied White's request to be represented by an at-
torney.' 69 Although White assured the court that he would appear to
testify, bond was set at $500.170 Consequently, upon his failure to post
bond, White was incarcerated pending a preliminary hearing scheduled
for October 18, 1984.171 At the preliminary hearing, White, again un-
represented by counsel, requested that the court release him on his own
recognizance. 172 Instead, Special City Judge Russell Bean, who pre-
sided over the hearing, raised White's bond to $1,500 and White re-
turned to jail. 173
In February, 1985, the defense attorney representing the murder
suspect inquired about White's circumstances. 17 4 At this time, the court
instructed the prosecution and the defense to "work together to release
[White]."' 75 In April of 1985, White, who was still in prison, wrote to
the Assistant District Attorney on the case requesting that he be re-
leased.' 76 White, however, remained incarcerated until June 27,
168. Id. Denson was later charged with the murder of Smith. Id. The pros-
ecution, however, eventually dropped the charges against him. Id.
169. Id.; see also White 1, 860 F.2d at 663. In the 1989 case, the court stated
that "White claims to have been told that he did not need an attorney." White II,
892 F.2d at 459.
170. White I, 860 F.2d at 663. The assurances White gave to the court were
not mentioned by the Sixth Circuit in the 1989 opinion. The 1988 opinion,
however, makes reference to White's statements that he would testify willingly.
Id. In the 1988 decision, the Sixth Circuit stated:
Despite the plaintiff's assurances that he would appear, the judge set the plain-
tiff's bond at $500 and, when he was unable to make bond, incarcer-
ated him at the Hamilton County Jail until a preliminary hearing set for
October 18, 1984. At the preliminary hearing, the plaintiff once again
was not afforded an attorney and was not advised of his rights .... The
judge raised the plaintiff's bond to $1,500 and, when White again was
unable to make bond, incarcerated him at the Hamilton County Jail de-
spite his request that he be released upon his own recognizance.
Id. (emphasis added).
171. White H, 892 F.2d at 459.
172. White 1, 860 F.2d at 663. The 1989 opinion states that White "re-
quest[ed] to sign his own bond." White M, 892 F.2d at 459. This request was
denied by Judge Bean who presided over White's preliminary hearing on Octo-
ber 18, 1984. Id.
173. White H, 892 F.2d at 459.
174. Id. The court stated that Denson's attorney "inquired about White's
continued incarceration, which prompted the court to instruct defense and pros-
ecution attorneys to work together to release White." Id. The court continued
by stating that "[t]wo weeks later, when Denson's attorney inquired about
White's continued incarceration, the prosecutor told him that if he would pre-
pare an order requesting White's release, the prosecution would present it to
the court." Id. Nothing more is mentioned by the Sixth Circuit concerning the
efforts of either party to procure White's release. White was not released until
some four months later. Id.
175. White I, 860 F.2d at 663.
176. Id.
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1985.177 Following his release, White voluntarily appeared in court and
was prepared to testify against the suspected murderer, Gregory Den-
son; however, the indictment against Denson was then dismissed at the
presecutor's request.178
Clyde White later brought two actions, pursuant to section 1983 of
the Civil Rights Act, protesting his extended incarceration. 179 The first
suit was brought in federal court against the District Attorney and his
assistants.1 8 0 The second suit, also instituted in federal court, was
brought against the City of Chattanooga and its agents and officers, in-
cluding the arresting officer and the appropriate judges. 181 The United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, in separate opinions, held
that both suits had been properly dismissed by the district court for the
reasons described below.' 8 2
B. The Tennessee Material Witness Provisions
In Tennessee, if it appears to the court "by affidavit that the testi-
mony of a person is material ... and if it is shown that the witness has
refused or will refuse to respond to process," the Tennessee material
witness provision authorizes the court to "require [the witness] to give
bail." 183 If the witness does not post bail the court has two options: it
can either "commit him to the custody of the sheriff pending final dispo-
sition of the proceeding in which the testimony is needed" or "order his
release if he has been detained for an unreasonable length of time." 18 4
It is this provision which authorized the city court to require that Clyde
177. White H, 892 F.2d at 459.
178. Id.; White I, 860 F.2d at 663.
179. Section 1983 of the United States Code, title 42 reads as follows:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regula-
tion, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Co-
lumbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in eq-
uity, or other proper proceeding for redress. For the purposes of this
section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of
Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of
Columbia.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
180. White 1, 860 F.2d at 662 n.1.
181. White II, 892 F.2d 457.
182. White II, 892 F.2d at 464. The case against the prosecuting attorneys
was dismissed because White had subsequently filed suit in the Tennessee
Claims Commission against the attorneys alleging the same violations. White I,
860 F.2d at 664.
183. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-11-110 (1990). For the full text of this section,
see supra note 3. Generally these provisions are supported by the doctrine that it
is not only the duty of a witness to offer his testimony at a criminal trial, but it is
also necessary to afford the defendant a fair trial.
184. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-11-110 (1990).
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White post bail or be detained upon his failure to do so, and, upon
which the Sixth Circuit relied in forming its opinion as to the validity of
White's detention.
Procedurally, if the aforementioned determinations are made as to a
witness' materiality and his unwillingness to testify, bail may be set in
accordance with section 40-11-117 ("Bail security required"), of the
Tennessee bail statute.' 8 5 In evaluating the actual treatment of a wit-
ness under section 40-11-117, and section 40-11-115 ("Release on re-
cognizance or unsecured bonds"), the court is referred to section 40-11-
116 ("Conditions on release") which requires that "the magistrate ...
impose the least onerous condition reasonably likely to assure the [wit-
ness'] appearance in court."' 8 6 The factors to be considered from sec-
tion 40-11-115 include the witness' "employment," "reputation,"
"family ties" and "financial condition."' 8 7 In essence, the Tennessee
legislature set forth these factors to serve as the standards by which the
determination is to be made as to whether the witness will appear at
185. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-11-117 (1990). This section states that: "Ab-
sent a showing that conditions on a release on recognizance will reasonably as-
sure the appearance of the [witness] as required, the magistrate shall, in lieu of
the conditions of release set out in § 40-11-115 or § 40-11-116, require bail to
be given." Id. This section implicitly recognizes that before bail is set, it must
befirst shown that the "conditions on a release on recognizance will [not] rea-
sonably assure the appearance" of the witness at trial. Id.
186. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-11-116 (1990). For the full text of § 40-11-
116, see supra note 3. Before the court reviews the conditions listed in § 40-11-
116 and considers them as potential options, it must first decide that the witness
should not be released on his own recognizance in accordance with § 40-11-115.
See TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-11-115 (1990). Section 40-11-115 states that the
"magistrate shall take into account [the following factors]" in making the deter-
mination of whether a release on the witness' own recognizance will be sufficient
to assure the witness' presence at trial. Id. (emphasis added). For the full list of
factors under § 40-11-115, see supra note 3.
In short, the structure of the Tennessee material witness provisions as a
whole is as follows: Section 40-11-110 ("Bail for material witnesses") refers the
court to § 40-11-117 ("Bail security required") which then refers the court to
§ 40-11-116 ("Conditions on release"). TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 40-11-110, -116,
-117. Section 40-11-117 allows that bail may be set "in lieu of the conditions of
release set out in § 40-11-115 or 40-11-116" if there is first a "showing that
conditions on a release on recognizance will [not] reasonably assure the appear-
ance of the [witness]." TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-11-117 (1990). Moreover, § 40-
11-116 specifically requires the court to "impose the least onerous condition rea-
sonably likely to assure the [witness'] appearance in court." TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 40-11-116. The Chattanooga City Court judicial officers, however, did not im-
pose the "least onerous" alternative when White's bail was set at an amount
which secured his prolonged and undefined incarceration. White II, 892 F.2d at
459. Yet, even Judge Jones in his dissenting opinion stated, contrary to the
mandatory language of § 40-11-116, that "neither the statutes of Tennessee nor
the United States Constitution currently mandates that less restrictive arrange-
ments be made." Id. at 465.
187. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-11-115 (1990). For the full text of this section,
see supra note 3.
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trial, either voluntarily or pursuant to supoena.' 8 8 Reviewing these fac-
tors it is not difficult to understand why a court might be reluctant to
release a homeless person -on an unsecured personal recognizance
bond.18 9
IV. ANALYSIS
Clyde White's case presents an extreme example of the dangers
faced by unrepresented homeless material witnesses. This analysis will
first focus on the obstacles encountered by White as a result of an inher-
ently prejudicial statute and its improper application by the judiciary. In
addition, this section will analyze the procedural measures which may
have been exercised by White if he had been afforded effective represen-
tation. The conclusion which necessarily follows is that a material wit-
ness who is threatened with actual incarceration must be provided with
the representation of counsel to protect him from the possibility of a
lengthy and unjust deprivation of his liberty.
A. The Tennessee Material Witness Statute: Procedure, Effect, and Prejudice?
1. Inherent Prejudice Toward the Homeless Witness
It cannot be ascertained from the White II opinion whether the de-
fendants, Deputy Clerk King, Judge Cox or Judge Bean, reviewed
White's status as a material witness or considered the conditions listed
188. Id. For the full text of section 40-11-115, see supra note 3. For a brief
discussion and list of the factors on which a Tennessee judge or magistrate is to
rely in making his determination as to the witness' release, see note 187 and
accompanying text.
189. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-11-115 (1990). For the full text of this section,
see supra note 3. Apparently, the legislature intended these factors, along with
"[a]ny other factors indicating the defendant's ties to the community or bearing
on the risk or willful failure to appear" to be determinative of whether the wit-
ness is sufficiently reliable whereby an unconditioned release will assure his ap-
pearance at trial. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-11-115. As the statute contemplates,
the decision to require the witness to post bail or put other restraints on his
freedom is left to the court's discretion. See TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 40-11-110, -
115, -116 (1990) (court or magistrate given discretion as to appropriate release
procedures).
When a witness is not to be released on his own recognizance pursuant to
§ 40-11-115, the court is to then consider imposing conditions on his release in
accordance with § 40-11-116. Section 40-11-116, however, states that the "mag-
istrate shall impose the least onerous" of these conditions. TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 40-11-116. Depriving a witness of his liberty would be the most onerous con-
dition in light of the options available in § 40-11-116, which allow the court to:
(1) Release the defendant into the care of some qualified person or
organization responsible for supervising the defendant and assisting
him in appearing in court .... [or]
(2) Place the defendant under the supervision of an available probation
counselor or other appropriate public official [or]
(3) Impose reasonable restrictions on the activities, movements, as-
sociations and residences of the defendant ....
TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-11-116.
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in the appropriate sections of the Tennessee statute. 190 In light of the
apparent legislatorial intent to impose upon the witness the "least oner-
ous" condition, however, it is submitted that the aforementioned de-
fendants did not take the proper procedural steps when confronted with
White's situation. 19 1
Upon closer examination, the factors listed in section 40-11-115 of
the Tennessee statute directly prejudice a homeless witness because his
indigence will, in and of itself, cause him to fall short of the required
showings. 1 92 As noted in the 1988 opinion, the judge who set White's
bail had substantial testimony from White that he would be willing to
190. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 40-11-115, -116, -117 (1990). For the full text of
these sections, see supra note 3.
191. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-11-116 (1990). White explained to the ju-
dicial officers presiding at his initial bond hearings that he would in fact volunta-
rily appear to testify. White I, 860 F.2d at 663. Hence, the judicial officers at that
time were not faced with a recalcitrant witness and, consequently, could have
imposed less restrictive alternatives upon White's liberty which would have as-
sured his presence at Denson's trial. Instead, the judicial officials set White's
bail at an amount which would do no less than ensure that White remained in
custody. Furthermore, if White's willingness to testimony had been closely ex-
amined, a court could have come to the conclusion, as did the dissent in the
1989 opinion, that because of White's willingness to testify, the court entirely
lacked any degree of the probable cause necessary to justify detaining him. See
White II, 892 F.2d at 464-65 (Jones, J., dissenting).
It should be noted that the judges, regardless of the issue of probable cause,
may have felt that the witness' situation, his homelessness and his alcoholism,
threatened his appearance at Denson's trial such that they believed incarceration
was the only answer. The judges decided on incarceration even though the stat-
ute includes alternatives such as: "Plac[ing] the [witness] under the supervision
of an available probation counselor or other appropriate public official" or
"[i]mpos[ing] any other reasonable restriction designed to assure the defend-
ant's appearance... not limited to the deposit of bail." TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-
11-116. In comparison to the Bail Reform Act of 1984, which mandates that the
witness will not be detained if he lacks the funds to post bail, the Tennessee
provisions fall short of attempting to insure that a person is not deprived of his
liberty without due process. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(2) (1988).
192. For the factors listed under § 40-11-115 of the Tennessee statute, see
supra note 3. These factors may easily be applied to a witness who maintains
some sort of employment and has a place of residence. Yet, a witness who has
no home and no money will ultimately fall short of the majority of the factors set
forth in § 40-11-115 to aid the court in its determination of whether the witness
will be required to post bail. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-11-115 (1990).
The factors to be considered include: employment status, financial condi-
tion, family ties and relationships, and reputation. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-11-
115. Although possible, it is unlikely that there will be a responsible member of
the community available to vouch for a homeless witness' reliability, if only for
the reason that there may be no one sufficiently acquainted with the witness to
be able to make such an evaluation. Hence, the inherent circumstances of a
homeless person may work to discriminate against him, regardless of his per-
sonal character or reliability. As a result, a homeless witness will likely be re-
quired to post bail, which of course will cause him to remain incarcerated. This
is assuming, however, that the witness is not afforded the representation which
may aid him in securing his release or dismissing his bail in exchange for his
deposition testimony. For an explanation of how the assistance of counsel can
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attend Denson's trial voluntarily. 19 3 Moreover, the White I opinion
states that White had requested the assistance of counsel; had counsel
been appointed, motions could have been made which would have expe-
dited his release. 19 4
If, in fact, the judicial defendants did not investigate whether White
had or would have "refuse[d] to respond to process," then there was no
justifiable reason to incarcerate him.195 Accordingly, White argued that
"his homelessness was the essential factual basis for the district court's
determination that his arrest and detention was authorized."'19 6 Unfor-
tunately, it is difficult to determine what procedures were employed by
King, Cox and Bean in setting and raising White's bail from which either
support or opposition for White's allegation could be found. 19 7 The
court merely stated that when King set White's bail, "she did so with
aid an indigent material witness faced with incarceration, see infra notes 222-41
and accompanying text.
193. White I, 860 F.2d at 663. Interestingly, the 1989 opinion is devoid of
any such statements made by White other than the statement made to the detec-
tive when he was first arrested. See White II, 892 F.2d at 458-59.
In the 1988 opinion, the court noted that White "assur[ed] [the judge] that
he would appear" and "request[ed] that he be released upon his own recogni-
zance." White I, 860 F.2d at 662-63. These requests to be released were denied
on October 12, 1984, at White's initial bond hearing, and on October 18, 1984,
at White and Denson's preliminary hearing. Id. at 663.
194. White I, 860 F.2d at 663. For a discussion of the necessity of counsel,
especially in the situation where a witness is taken into custody for an indefinite
amount of time, see infra notes 222-41 and accompanying text.
195. According to § 40-11-110 of the Tennessee bail statute, a court is au-
thorized to incarcerate a material witness who fails to post bail: (1) "If it appears
by affidavit that the testimony of a person is material to any criminal proceed-
ing" and (2) "it is shown that the witness has refused or will refuse to respond to
process." TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-11-110 (1990). These two factors constitute
the probable cause necessary to arrest and detain a witness; without both of
these factors having been satisfied by some sort of investigation or supporting
affidavit, a witness may not be legitimately detained. For a discussion of the
probable cause element, see supra notes 47-72 and accompanying text. See also
White II, 892 F.2d at 464-65 (Jones, J., dissenting).
196. White H, 892 F.2d at 464. For a discussion of the application of the
Tennessee statute to indigent and homeless witnesses, see supra notes 192-94
and accompanying text.
197. The procedure necessary to satisfy the probable cause requirement
would have mandated that the court inquire into whether White was willing to
appear before the court and testify at the trial of the alleged murderer. The
court, according to the Tennessee statute, should have been able to make this
determination based on the affidavit. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-11-110 (1990).
For a discussion of the affidavit used in White, see infra notes 199-208 and ac-
companying text. Whether the defendants properly followed any of the proce-
dures pursuant to §§ 40-11-110, -115, -116, or -117 cannot be determined
because the Sixth Circuit's reported opinion is devoid of any indication as to
whether the defendants made the proper inquiry regarding White's willingness
to appear or whether they had considered more feasible and less onerous alter-
natives, rather, the Sixth Circuit simply concluded that the defendants had the
necessary probable cause to detain White.
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authority and in accordance with the governing statute." 19 8 If the court
actually did consider the factors of section 40-11-115, it would become
obvious that the provision works as an undefeatable barrier against
homeless people.
2. The Deficiency of the Affidavit as a Basis for a Finding of Probable Cause
According to the Tennessee statute authorizing the court to set bail
for a recalcitrant witness the court is to rely on an affidavit to determine
whether "the witness has refused or will refuse to respond to pro-
cess." 199 If such a finding is made, the court may then proceed by "re-
quirting] [the witness] to give bail . . . for his appearance" and
"commit[ing] him to the custody of the sheriff" if he fails to do so.2 00
The affidavit in White's case listed White as a "state's witness."' 20 ' No
198. White II, 892 F.2d at 464. Section 40-11-110 of the Tennessee bail
statute requires a showing of probable cause. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-11-110
(1990). Yet, the court felt that defendant King had conformed with this statute.
White H, 892 F.2d at 464. King, however, made no inquiry or investigation
which would have amounted to a showing of probable cause as to whether
White's testimony was material and whether he would refuse to respond to pro-
cess. Id. at 463. For a discussion of the dissent's opinion in White 11 regarding
the lack of probable cause, see infra notes 209-21 and accompanying text.
199. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-11-110 (1990). For the full text of this section,
see supra note 3. This procedure is essentially the same throughout the state
material witness provisions as well as the federal provisions. For a discussion of
the various state and federal provisions, see supra notes 25, 26, 39 and infra note
239.
Both the Tennessee material witness provisions and the federal provisions
allow the court to rely solely on an affidavit to make the required determinations
which work to meet the probable cause showing. See 18 U.S.C. § 3144 (1988);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-11-110 (1990).
The Connecticut material witness provision provides that if any state's at-
torney makes out a written complaint alleging "(1) that a person named therein
is or will be a material witness in a criminal proceeding . . .and (2) that the
state's attorney believes that such witness is likely to disappear from the state...
refuse or fail to appear ... as a witness . . .the court shall issue a warrant."
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-82j (West 1985). In regard to arrest procedures,
the Iowa Code provides that, so long as the arresting officer has "probable cause
to believe that a person is a necessary and material witness to a felony and that
such person might be unavailable for service of a subpoena, the officer may
arrest such person as a material witness with or without an arrest warrant."
IOWA CODE ANN. § 804.11 (West 1979).
For a discussion of other state statutes, see supra notes 25, 37, 39 and infra
note 239.
200. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-11-110 (1990).
201. White H, 892 F.2d at 463. King had provided this statement of White's
classification in the space which required a statement of the offense with which
the defendant or witness had been charged. Id. The affidavit in White's case
was set forth by Detective Angel before Deputy City Court Clerk Connie King,
following White's arrest. Id. at 459.
The Sixth Circuit noted that the district court judge "for the purpose of his
opinion, assumed that King did set White's bail." Id. at 464 n.5. It appears clear
from the record that King did not set White's bail, rather, she only issued the
affidavit of complaint against White which in and of itself was deficient. See id. at
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determination, however, was made at that time as to whether there was
any reason to believe White would or would not willingly appear at Den-
son's trial.20 2 In fact, the Sixth Circuit conceded that the "affidavit was
deficient" in this nature, but the court stated that this error was
harmless. 20 s
As to the affidavit's invalidity and its effect on White's detention, the
opinion reads as follows:
[Tihe affidavit was deficient because it lacked any assessment of
the probability of White's future appearance and testimony at
Denson's trial. We agree with the district court that this defi-
ciency in the complaint was harmless in view of Angel's valid
authority to arrest White as a material witness and in view of
the fact that, within twenty-four hours of his arrest, White ap-
peared before Judge Cox and was given the opportunity to
make bail.2 0 4
Had the affidavit been used simply to establish the authority to arrest
White, the "deficiency" may have constituted harmless error because
White's arrest had been based on an independent finding of probable
cause. 20 5 Yet, the court's authority to detain a witness also rests on this
affidavit. 20 6 IfJudge Cox, who first set the bail in the amount of $500,
and Judge Bean, who raised the bail to $1,500, relied on this affidavit to
make their determination of whether White's testimony was "material"
and whether White "has refused or will refuse to respond to process,"
the "deficiency" of this affidavit was crucial to the outcome of White's
463 (court states: "the affidavit was deficient because it lacked any assessment of
the probability of White's future appearance and testimony at Denson's trial").
Whether or not King's actions inflicted "constitutional injury" upon White was
irrelevant, as the Sixth Circuit held that King was "entitled to absolute immu-
nity" because "setting bail is a quasi-judicial activity." Id. at 464. Although
King did not set White's bail, she did issue an affidavit of complaint in compli-
ance with Rule 5 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure; apparently, this
is also a "quasi-judicial activity." Id. at 459.
202. Id. at 463.
203. Id.
204. Id. The validity of White's arrest was discussed by the court when it
addressed White's § 1983 claim against the arresting officer. Id. at 460. The
relevant section which authorizes the court to set bail for the release of a mate-
rial witness whose trial attendance is in doubt, does not itself authorize the
arrest of a material witness. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-11-110 (1990). The
court, however, felt that "this statute inherently contemplates that material wit-
nesses are subject to arrest and detention under appropriate circumstances.
Such an interpretation is necessary to effectuate the statutory authority given to
courts to impose bail on material witnesses." White 11, 892 F.2d at 460. The
district court had made this examination of § 40-11-110, with which the Sixth
Circuit agreed, because "apparently [no Tennessee court] ha[d] considered
whether Tennessee law explicitly authorizes a police officer to arrest and detain
a material witness to a crime without first obtaining a warrant." Id.
205. White 11, 892 F.2d at 460.
206. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-11-110 (1990).
638 [Vol. 36: p. 597
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predicament. 20 7 Nonetheless, the Sixth Circuit described the affidavit's
deficiency as "harmless. ' 20 8 From the court's relation of the facts, how-
ever, it is quite possible that the judicial officers never addressed the
issue of whether bail should have been required at all.
The dissenting opinion of Circuit Judge Nathaniel Jones did ad-
dress the issue of the district court's failure to investigate the likelihood
of White voluntarily appearing before the court to offer his testi-
mony. 20 9 Judge Jones concluded that the "probable cause threshold"
had not been met and hence White should not have been detained in the
same manner as "Denson, the person charged with murder. '21 0 Judge
Jones further stated:
[T]he arrest and detention of a citizen as a material witness re-
quires a showing of probable cause under the Fourth Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution because under the
Fourth Amendment "the essential element is the physical re-
straint placed upon the person, not the purpose behind the re-
straint" . . . [T]he arrest and detention of a witness is an
exceptional measure to be employed only in instances where
voluntary cooperation appears unfeasible. 21 t
The "probable cause threshold" addressed by Judge Jones would only
have been met if, based on a sworn affidavit, the court had found that
White's testimony was material to Denson's criminal charges and that
White would likely refuse to appear at Denson's trial.2 12 Had the pre-
207. White 11, 892 F.2d at 459. The affidavit required by the Tennessee
statute serves as the document which validates the arrest and detention of a ma-
terial witness. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-11-110 (1990). In it must appear a
showing that the witness' testimony is both material to the incident and a show-
ing that there is reason to believe the witness will not appear before the court at
a later date; if these elements are contained within the affidavit, it is presumed
that the judicial officer has the necessary probable cause, after evaluating the
specific circumstances and character of the witness, to require that the witness
post bail. Id. Hence, in White's case, the affidavit set forth by Detective Angel
and signed by Clerk King, served as the document upon which the probable
cause to detain White was based. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-11-110.
208. White 1I, 892 F.2d at 463.
209. Id. at 464-65.
210. Id. at 465. Many cases have acknowledged the fact that situations have
arisen where the material witness, detained pursuant to a material witness stat-
ute, has remained incarcerated while the actual defendant has been able to post
bail and effectuate his release from jail. See Comment, supra note 39, at 503
(describing the following: "A defendant charged with highway robbery was re-
leased on bail in the usual manner pending trial. At the trial, six months later, it
appeared that the complaining witness had throughout this period been incar-
cerated for his inability to post bond.").
211. White II, 892 F.2d at 464-65 (Jones, J., dissenting) (quoting Bacon v.
United States, 449 F.2d 933, 942 (9th Cir. 1971)).
212. Id. at 465. Although White made other statements affirming his com-
mitment to appear before the trial court at Denson's hearing, neither the major-
ity nor the dissent acknowledged such statements. Id. In the Sixth Circuit's
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siding judicial officers, after sufficient inquiry, then concluded that
White was a recalcitrant witness, the requirement of probable cause
would thereby have been satisfied. 2 13 Apparently, no such investigation
was conducted and, therefore, the court's detention of White was un-
substantiated by any showing of probable cause as required by the
fourth amendment. 21 4 The court, however, despite the lack of probable
cause, felt that it was necessary to detain White for 288 days based on
the fact that he had once stated that "he preferred not to be a
'snitch.' ",215
In his dissent, Judge Jones further criticized the majority's depen-
dence on this statement as well as White's one statement that "he would
like to not have to testify."' 2 16 Judge Jones argued: "These statements
do not imply a refusal."'2 17 Rather, he felt that few innocent bystanders
"would be undaunted by the thought of having to testify to the occur-
rence of a murder, and White's statements merely reflected his under-
standable fear of this prospect." '2 18
If an indigent or homeless witness is taken into custody because his
testimony is deemed material by the court or the arresting officer, his
willingness to testify should serve as the decisive factor as to whether he
should remain in custody. Only that witness who does not want to tes-
tify, who will refuse to respond to process and who is also unable to
afford the bail set by the court should be turned over to the custody of
the state pending his appearance in court. 21 9 From a review of White's
statements as reported in the 1988 opinion, he did in fact represent to
the judicial officials that he was willing to testify. 220 It therefore follows
that, as White was not a recalcitrant witness, he should not have been
detained. 22 '
1988 opinion regarding White's claims against the prosecuting attorneys, how-
ever, statements assuring White's appearance were recorded by the judicial offi-
cials presiding over White's bond hearings. White 1, 860 F.2d at 663. For a
discussion of the statements made by White at this time, see supra notes 169-73
and accompanying text. See also TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-11-110 (1990).
213. White H, 892 F.2d at 464-65.
214. For a discussion of the fourth amendment as it relates to the physical
seizure of a material witness, see supra notes 47-72 and accompanying text. Spe-
cifically, the court in Cochran recognized the rights which automatically attach
when a person is deprived of his liberty. Application of Cochran, 434 F. Supp.
1207, 1212 (D. Neb. 1977).
215. White 1I, 892 F.2d at 464. For a discussion of the invalidity of the affi-
davit attesting to White's "preference" not to be a "snitch," see supra notes 199-
208 and accompanying text.
216. White H, 892 F.2d at 465.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-11-110 (1990).
220. White 1, 860 F.2d at 663.
221. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. For a discussion of the sixth amendment con-
frontation clause, see supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
640 [Vol. 36: p. 597
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B. The Lack of Assistance of Counsel and Its Effect on the Homeless
Representation by counsel is essential to the disposition of a mate-
rial witness who is arrested and then threatened with the possibility of
incarceration. Once a witness has been indefinitely detained and is
awaiting the trial of a defendant against whom he is to testify, there is
little he will be able to do to remedy his situation without the aid of
counsel. 2 22 Without such assistance, it is difficult for an indigent or
homeless material witness to procure his own release or be assured that
the judges who set his bail will comply with the statutory require-
ments.2 2 3 Instead, as in White's case, a witness can remain incarcerated
until his testimony is given at trial even though he states that he will
voluntarily offer his testimony when needed. 224
If a witness has the assistance of counsel, effective procedures can
be employed to aid the witness and assure that any detention by the
court is in fact warranted. For instance, counsel may move for an order
to depose the witness instead of allowing the court to detain him for an
unreasonable length of time.2 25 The presence of counsel can also work
222. For a discussion of the procedures for remedying an unlawful incar-
ceration pursuant to a material witness provision, see supra notes 141-61 and
accompanying text.
223. For a discussion of the doctrine of judicial immunity, see supra notes
155-61 and accompanying text. See also 1 COOK & SOBIESKI, CIVIL RIGHTS Ac-
TIONS § 2.07 (1990) (in depth discussion ofjudicial immunity and claims of civil
rights violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988)).
224. A witness may indeed state that he will voluntarily appear at trial and
there may be no probable cause to believe otherwise, yet, without the safeguard
of counsel's assistance and representation, the court could still require the wit-
ness to post bail and thus create the possibility of prolonged detention for a
witness who cannot afford bail. In this type of situation, the court is unlikely to
be held liable for such a constitutional infringement, under the doctrine ofjudi-
cial immunity. See White 11, 892 F.2d at 461-64.
225. In the following cases, motions were granted ordering depositions to
be taken of material witnesses held pursuant to a material witness provision.
The motions were presented by the witness' counsel in each circumstance. Each
of these cases involve the federal material witness provisions.
In United States v. Rivera, 859 F.2d 1204, 1205 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
490 U.S. 1020 (1989), illegal aliens had counsel appointed for them by the
court. The counsel "shortly thereafter ... made a motion to have their testi-
mony taken by deposition pursuant to the Material Witness Statute, 18 U.S.C.
§ 3144 and the Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 15." Id. (footnotes omit-
ted). The motion also requested that the witnesses be "released from custody
and allowed to leave the country." Id. at 1206. The motion was granted by the
trial court which stated:
Exceptional circumstances have been shown in that the witnesses are
being incarcerated awaiting a trial. And humanitarian considerations
alone demand that something be done to release them from incarcera-
tion, when their only purpose for being incarcerated is to be witnesses.
And whether they voluntarily flee after their depositions have been
taken or whether the INS deports them back to their countries of origin
is beside the point.
Id. at 1206. Without the assistance of counsel, these witnesses would probably
1991] NOTE
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to ensure that the court will not deprive the witness of his liberty without
proper justification. 226 In any case, counsel can effectively put forth the
witness' statements as to his willingness or refusal to testify at a later
date.
The necessity of counsel was recognized by the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Western District of Texas, in Class Action Application for
Habeas Corpus, when it enforced section 3142(f) of the Bail Reform
Act. 227 The court in Class Action held that sections 3144 and 3142 of the
not have been released as they had already been held for approximately three
weeks before any motion had been filed with the court. Id. at 1205.
A similar situation arose in United States v. Guadian-Salazar, 824 F.2d 344
(5th Cir. 1987), where illegal aliens who were material witnesses to a crime were
held by the court. In this case, a counsel appointed by the court "filed a motion
for the reduction of bond or for taking oral depositions." Id. at 345. This mo-
tion was granted by the court and the depositions were scheduled. Id. The dis-
trict court, relying on Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,
found that the "case present[ed] 'exceptional circumstances' and that 'the inter-
ests ofjustice' require[d] the taking of depositions." Id. at 346 (quoting FED. R.
CRIM. P. 15(a)).
The defendants in the above cases challenged the use of the depositions,
claiming that they had been denied the "constitutional right to confront adverse
witnesses, guaranteed by the sixth amendment, thereby depriving [them] of due
process of law under the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution."
Id.; see Rivera, 859 F.2d at 1206. The Rivera court held that the "introduction of
these depositions at appellant's trial did not deny him the right of confronta-
tion." Rivera, 859 F.2d at 1207. Rather, as the motion to depose was supported
by both the witness' counsel and the U.S. Attorney, the Rivera court found that
the "exceptional circumstances" required by Rule 15(a) were met and that the
"witnesses were entitled to release . . . [as] their testimony could be and was
adequately secured by deposition." Id. at 1208-09. Conversely, the court in
Guadian-Salazar eversed the defendant's conviction based on the use of the dep-
ositions at trial. 824 F.2d at 347. In order to introduce the depositions as evi-
dence the government needed to establish that the witnesses were unavailable to
testify. Id. At trial, however, the court found that the government failed to make
the sufficient showing of the witnesses' unavailability. Id. This determination
was uncontested by the government and in response the court reversed the de-
fendant's conviction. Id.
226. Often, actions brought by material witnesses to procure their release
are in the form of a writ of habeas corpus. See Class Action for Habeas Corpus
612 F. Supp. 940 (W.D. Tex. 1985); Application of Cochran, 434 F. Supp. 1207
(D. Neb. 1977). Hence, if a witness can acquire adequate representation during
the bail proceedings, it is possible to insure that the court follows the proper
statutory requirements. For example, White lacked the assistance of counsel
throughout his 288 day incarceration and thus had no adequate opportunity to
challenge the conduct of the court. White H, 892 F.2d at 459. Once he was
released and had finally obtained counsel, White's § 1983 claim was, for all prac-
tical purposes, worthless. The claim was dismissed because of the defendant's
judicial immunity and, therefore, White was left without a remedy for his wrong-
ful incarceration. Id. at 464.
227. Class Action, 612 F. Supp. 940. For a discussion of Class Action, see supra
notes 131-34 and accompanying text.
In pertinent part, § 3144 of the Bail Reform Act "unambiguously provides
that material witnesses are to be treated in accordance with Title 18, United
States Code, Section 3142 which addresses the release of defendants prior to
trial." Class Action, 612 F. Supp. at 942. Section 3142 provides that the witness
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Bail Reform Act together "clear[ly] . . . contemplate[] the appointment
of counsel for defendants that are financially unable to secure represen-
tation." 2 28 Perhaps most significantly, the court explained that "[tihe
fundamental requirement of due process is an opportunity to be
heard" 2 29 and that this "opportunity to be heard must be given at a
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner."' 230 Quoting the United
States Supreme Court in Mathews v. Eldridge,23 ' the district court ana-
lyzed three factors "to determine what process is constitutionally
due."'23 2 It then applied these factors to the material witness'
circumstances.233
Beginning with the premise that, "commitment for any purpose
constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process
protection,""2 4 the court came to the following conclusions. First,
must be given a detention hearing at which time "the person has the right to be
represented by counsel, and, if financially unable to obtain adequate representa-
tion, to have counsel appointed." 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f) (1988). Section 3142 of
the Bail Reform Act of 1984 provides that
[i]f ajudicial officer determines that a defendant should not be released
on his own recognizance or on an unsecured appearance bond, a hear-
ing must be held to determine whether any condition or combination of
conditions can be imposed upon the defendant that will reasonably as-
sure his appearance at trial and the safety of any other person and the
community.
Class Action, 612 F. Supp. at 943 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3142(a), (b), (c) & (f)).
228. Class Action, 612 F. Supp. at 943. The court further explained that the
appointment of counsel is supported by recent amendments to the guidelines
for the administration of the Criminal Justice Act approved by the United States
Judicial Conference at its March 1985 proceedings. Id. One such amendment
stated: "[T]he Bail Reform Act of 1984 requires that counsel be appointed to
provide representation at a detention hearing for a person who has been ar-
rested as a material witness." Id. (quoting ADMINISTRTIVE OFFICE OF THE
UNITED STATES COURTS, VII GUIDE TO JUDICIARY POLICIES AND PROCEDURES, sec.
A, ch. 2, para. 2.15 (1985)).
229. Class Action, 612 F. Supp. at 944 (citing Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527,
540 (1981)). The due process clause of the fifth amendment, applied to the
states by the fourteenth amendment, provides that "[n]o person shall ... be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST.
amend V.
230. Class Action, 612 F. Supp. at 944 (citing Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527,
540 (1981); Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965)).
231. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
232. The factors are stated as follows:
First, the private interests that will be affected by the official action;
second, the risk of erroneous deprivation of such interests through the
procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substi-
tute procedural safeguards; and finally, the government's interest, in-
cluding the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens
that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.
Id. (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)).
233. Id. at 944-45.
234. Id. at 944 (quoting Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979)).
The court also relied on Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion in Joint Anti-
Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951). Class Action,
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"[t]he private interests at stake where material witnesses are concerned
strike at the very heart of the values sought to be protected by our Con-
stitution-liberty. '23 5 Second, the "risk of erroneous deprivation of an
individual's liberty" mandates the need for counsel to safeguard against
"erroneous" deprivations of a witness' liberty.23 6 Finally, the court con-
cluded that, although the courts may be burdened with more adminis-
trative proceedings in order to resolve the issues surrounding a witness'
incarceration, the "additional burden on the Court and on counsel is
more than outweighed by the liberty interest of material witnesses." '23 7
In Application of Cochran,23 8 the United States District Court for the
District of Nebraska, dealing with a Nebraska material witness provision,
612 F. Supp. at 944. ForJustice Frankfurter's comment on the right to be heard,
see supra text accompanying note 137. See also supra notes 110-18 and accompa-
nying text for the Supreme Court's analysis of the relationship between incarcer-
ation and the requirement of counsel in criminal proceedings.
235. Class Action, 612 F. Supp. at 944. The court further noted that if the
situation does arise where it is necessary to detain a material witness, thereby
depriving him of his liberty, § 3144 requires that the witness "be deposed if
certain requirements are met." Id. at 945. In this way, both the liberty interests
of the witness as well as the sixth amendment interests of the defendant can be
protected.
236. Id. at 945. For instance, the need to depose a witness for the purpose
of securing his release will often require a motion or request by the witness'
attorney. The absence of counsel at that time would "not only create the risk of
erroneous deprivations of liberty, but also create the risk of unnecessarily pro-
longed deprivations of liberty." Id. The assistance of counsel can be particu-
larly determinative as to the extent of a witness' detention if that witness is
indigent. For example, any witness taken into custody who cannot post bail will
want to procure his release by giving his deposition. This will require a motion
by counsel and possibly an argument before the court on why it would be unjust
to detain the witness. For cases where counsel challenged material witness pro-
visions and their execution as violative of witness constitutional rights and cases
involving the federal deposition procedures, see supra notes 146-54.
The district court in Class Action also listed three specific reasons why it
viewed the assistance of counsel as "beneficial to individuals incarcerated as ma-
terial witnesses." Id. at 945. The court stated:
Appointment of counsel will ensure 1) that it is appropriate to detain
the individual as a material witness; 2) that the individual will not be
incarcerated when there are other means available to secure his pres-
ence at trial; and 3) that any incarceration of an individual will not be
prolonged unnecessarily.
Id. at 945-46.
Under the Tennessee provisions, if an indigent or homeless witness asserts
that he would not like to be a "snitch," and is then taken into custody pursuant
to Tennessee's material witness provision, he will almost certainly be detained
until the time his testimony can be given at trial. The reason for such an out-
come is that he will not be able to afford any bail the court might set to secure
his testimony. Furthermore, there will be no counsel who can argue to the court
that the witness has been held for an unreasonable length of time, that the bail
should be lowered or that a deposition order should be granted.
237. Class Action, 612 F. Supp. 946.
238. 434 F. Supp. 1207 (D. Neb. 1977).
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came to similar conclusions. 23 9 There the court stated that "the right to
counsel . . .is so frequently a crucial element of due process." 240 The
court viewed a material witness' right to counsel as one which would aid
the witness in retaining his liberty until and unless there is a constitu-
tionally valid justification for taking it away. 24 '
The argument in favor of effective representation for any material
witness who is arrested and faced with the possibility of incarceration is
based upon the premise, inherent in our society, that every individual
retains a profound liberty interest which cannot be denied unless just
cause has been shown to limit it. If White had the benefit of counsel
during his prolonged incarceration, such counsel may have been able to
procure White's release either through an order requiring that the par-
ties take his deposition or by an order requiring that the court reduce his
bail. Furthermore, if counsel had represented White during the initial
stages of his detention proceedings, White could have been assured that
the judicial officers would have followed the proper statutory proce-
dures. Specifically, counsel could have worked to demand that any re-
quirement to post bail be based on a showing of probable cause and that
other forms or conditions of release be considered. If witnesses are per-
secuted because the court fails to make sufficient probable cause deter-
minations and counsel is not available to protect a witness when the
court acts erroneously, few indigent witnesses, including those who live
239. Id. at 1216. The Nebraska material witness provisions involved
provided:
When the magistrate is satisfied that any witness against the ac-
cused will not appear and testify at the trial, he may, when the offense
charge is a felony, order him to recognize with sufficient securities. Any
person may recognize for a married woman or minor to appear as a
witness, or the magistrate may take the recognizance of either in a sum
not exceeding one hundred dollars, which shall be valid notwithstand-
ing the disability of coverture or minority.
NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-507 (1943).
If any witness so required to enter into a recognizance refuses to
comply with such order, the magistrate shall commit him or her to jail
until he or she complies with such order or is otherwise discharged ac-
cording to the law.
Id. § 29-508 (1943).
240. Cochran, 434 F. Supp. at 1214 (citing In Re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967));
see also Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring).
241. Cochran, 434 F. Supp. at 1214. The court compared the circumstances
of a material witness to those of a person facing charges of delinquency in juve-
nile court. Id. These circumstances, insofar that they deprive a person of his
liberty when he has committed no crime, can also be compared to those of a
person who is to be committed to a mental hospital. In Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S.
480 (1980), a prisoner in the state prison was to be transferred to a mental hos-
pital. The question presented before the Supreme Court was whether this invol-
untary transfer "implicate[d] a liberty interest that is protected by the Due
Process Clause." Id. at 487. The Court concluded that due process was re-
quired under such circumstances. Id. at 491. Furthermore, the court held that it
is "appropriate that counsel be provided to indigent prisoners whom the State
seeks to treat as mentally ill." Id. at 497.
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on the streets in a position to witness a wide range of criminal activity,
will voluntarily come forth with crucial information.
V. CONCLUSION
There can be no justification for denying a material witness his lib-
erty if and when he informs the court that he will voluntarily appear to
testify. If the witness is less than willing, and the court believes he will
not appear to testify, it is within the court's discretion to place condi-
tions on his liberty or require him to post bail. The protections which
the due process clause guarantees, however, must be afforded in situa-
tions where the court acts effectively to deprive an innocent person of
his freedom. Nothing is more crucial, nor more a part of our society's
foundation, than the basic rights of liberty and due process. The right
to be heard and represented by counsel is not only necessary "to any
proceeding where an individual is for the first time threatened with a
loss of liberty" but is "required" under the due process clause. 24 2 If an
indigent homeless witness is to be incarcerated because he cannot afford
bail, he is entitled to be heard under the due process clause of the fifth
and fourteenth amendments. Only the assistance of counsel can assure
that a witness will be heard and that those who are required to listen will
fulfill their duty.
Lisa Chanow Dykstra
242. Class Action, 612 F. Supp. at 944, 947. The court in Class Action applied
the rationale of both Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), and Powell v.
Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932), as well as the test set forth in Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976), to a material witness' case. Class Action, 612
F. Supp. at 944, 947. In conclusion, the court found that without the assistance
and protection of counsel, "individuals that are incarcerated without being
charged with criminal activity are afforded less protection than individuals
charged with criminal activity." Id. at 945 (footnote omitted).
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